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Purpose:  The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of certain 
firm-level corporate governance characteristics on the underpricing 
of foreign IPOs issued on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Method: This thesis relies on a quantitative research method, using a 
deductive research approach, testing hypotheses through multiple 
regression analysis. 
 
Theoretical perspective: This thesis is founded on financial theories on IPO underpricing, 
information asymmetry and adverse selection, signaling and firm-
level corporate governance. In addition, relevant previous studies 
on domestic and foreign IPOs are presented. 
 
Empirical foundation: The empirical foundation consists of a unique sample of foreign 
IPOs on the LSE and AIM between 2004-01-01 and 2011-12-31. 
 
Conclusions: The study concludes that the size of a firms’ board of directors 
does not influence foreign IPO underpricing in any direction. 
Further, higher proportions of independent board members do not 
impact foreign IPO underpricing. Statistical significance is found 
for a negative association between having an independent 
chairman and foreign IPO underpricing. Furthermore, the study 
concludes that CEO/founder duality is not statistically associated 
with foreign IPO underpricing, but interesting tendencies towards 
a positive association are found.  
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1. Introduction 
This introductory section presents a brief background on the subject of foreign IPOs. This is 
followed by a research problem discussion leading up to a presentation of the purpose of this 
thesis. Important demarcations are established and an outline of this thesis is given. 
1.1 Background 
Over the past ten years, the financial world has witnessed several spectacular cross-border 
Initial Public Offerings. The list includes Prada in Hong Kong and Manchester United in New 
York (PWC, 2012). Recent attention is directed at the anticipated IPO by Alibaba, the 
Chinese E-commerce giant, in New York. These events shed light on complex global trends 
towards increasingly global capital markets (Stulz, 1999). 
 
Scholars are fairly united around the thought that national markets are becoming part of a 
global equity market (Oxelheim, 2000). This new reality adds additional dimensions to the 
traditional capital raising decision. Firms wishing to secure funding today face crucial 
decisions regarding geographical location (Henderson, Jagadeesh & Weisbach, 2006).  
 
One important aspect when understanding global capital streams is the occurrence of initial 
public offerings (from now on: IPOs) on foreign, non-domestic marketplaces (Caglio, Weiss 
Hanley & Marietta Westberg, 2013). These occurrences are here referred to as foreign IPOs 
or cross-border IPOs
1
.  
 
A growing number of firms take the decision to list their shares on foreign stock exchanges, 
leading the supply of possible listing destinations to grow and the competition among them to 
intensify (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 2006). In today’s world, firms originating from countries 
with less developed home institutions can increasingly bypass them through the use of foreign 
capital markets, leading to a situation where listing destinations are becoming less obvious 
and the group of cross-border issuers more heterogeneous (Doidge, Karolyi & Stultz, 2012). 
During the last two decades, there has been an increase in significance of firms seeking to 
raise initial equity capital on stock exchanges located outside of their home country. This 
development has not only yielded scholarly attention, but is also the focus of practitioners. A 
                                                 
1
 A deeper discussion on the exact definition of a foreign IPO can be found in section 1.5. 
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report from 2012 by PWC shows that foreign IPOs now make up a considerable portion of 
total IPO volume and value worldwide
2
. Figure 1 below shows the significance of cross-
border IPOs presented as proportions of worldwide IPO volumes and values. Between 2002 
and 2011, foreign IPOs represent 9 percent of the total volume and 13 percent of the total 
value of all IPOs. A peak is reached in 2006 before the financial crisis, reaching 25 percent of 
the global value of all IPO proceeds. In 2011, the number is once again approaching the levels 
witnessed in 2006, indicating that the financial crisis of 2007 and the years following had a 
negative impact on the attractiveness of foreign IPOs (see figure 1 below). It is however well 
documented that IPOs generally fluctuate significantly over time, impacted by periods of high 
demand for capital and varying levels of investor sentiment (Lowry, 2003). Research scholars 
have also documented the activity. For example, Doidge et al. (2012) report that the share of 
worldwide IPO proceeds raised outside of issuers’ home markets is double what it was in year 
1990. According to Calgio et al. (2013), total proceeds from IPOs by firms going public on 
foreign stock exchanges between 1995 and 2007 represent almost half a trillion dollars, or 25 
percent of the total value of all IPOs worldwide. 
 
Figure 1. The shares of annual worldwide IPO proceeds and volume accounted for by foreign IPOs 
between the years 2002 and 2011. Numbers shown inside the graph are rounded percentages. 
 
Source: PWC report, 2012 
 
                                                 
2
 The definitions of cross-border IPOs in PWC (2012) differs slightly from the stricter definition used in this 
thesis. PWC defines a cross-border IPO as one where more than 50 percent of proceeds are raised abroad. 
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1.2 Research Problem discussion 
The research field investigating foreign equity listings is well-explored and well-developed, 
with multiple scholars leaving important contributions (Pagano, Roell & Zechner, 2002; 
Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2004). Part of the research problem addressed in this thesis springs 
from the lack of attention warded fundamental differences within the field of foreign equity 
listings.    
 
Most commonly, researchers investigating foreign equity listings have done so within the 
field of international stock cross-listings (for definitions, see section 1.5). To bundle all types 
of foreign equity listings under the research field of cross-listings poses problems stemming 
from heterogeneous aspects of the included listings. Caglio et al. (2013) point out two 
important differences between cross-listings and the focus of this study, foreign IPOs that 
have been left aside in foreign equity listing literature. Yet, foreign IPOs alone are of sizeable 
economic importance, shown in section 1.1. First, cross-listings include both companies with 
and without previous trading history. Second, cross-listing transactions do not necessarily 
involve raising new capital, as is a criterion for foreign IPOs (Caglio et al., 2013). Bruner, 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) shed light on this issue when acknowledging that a large 
part of firms included in studies on foreign listings already trade on their home exchange. The 
decision to cross-list is most commonly a strategic manoeuvre to establish a second market 
for shares already traded on the respective home exchange (Karolyi & Gagnon, 2010). In a 
well-cited study, Pagano et al. (2002) state a fundamental reason to why distinctions between 
foreign IPOs and cross-listings are not necessary and subsequently have not been made. The 
authors argue that the decision by a firm to list its shares for the first time on a foreign market 
is closely related to the fundamental reasons behind why firms go public at all, abroad or at 
home.  
 
Aligning with Caglio et al. (2013) and Jonathan (2013), several aspects do however indicate 
that foreign IPOs are a unique target for research and that traditional IPO research on 
domestic samples fall short on defining important differences between domestic and foreign 
IPOs. This thesis is founded on growing evidence that foreign IPOs offer a distinct target of 
research, when compared to both domestic IPOs and international stock cross-listings.    
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At the present time, there is a lack of corporate governance studies directed at the UK (Guest, 
2008), and much foreign equity listing literature has been focused on US capital markets. The 
research value of corporate governance studies with a focus on the UK, as opposed to the US, 
is highlighted by the special properties of the UK legal system (Moore, Bell & Filatotchev, 
2012). Corporate governance regulations for public firms in the UK have a long tradition of 
“softer” laws, with an emphasis on self-regulatory arrangements and personal networks 
(Moore, Bell & Filatotchev, 2010). The two common law systems vary significantly in many 
regards, rendering firms corporate governance arrangements in the UK subject to much 
greater variation, due to a looser legal regulations regarding corporate governance (Guest, 
2008). 
 
As a consequence of the limited literary attention, firms who seek to go abroad at the time of 
an IPO have been left without important theoretical recommendations. Research on corporate 
governance characteristics in the context of foreign IPOs is a highly unexplored research 
field, with few existing recommendations on successful firm-level corporate governance 
signals (Moore et al., 2010). Studies on domestic IPO samples have been carried out (Certo, 
Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002), showing how internal corporate 
governance arrangements play important signaling roles in determining short-term 
performance of domestic IPOs. Many indications also point to compounded difficulties for 
foreign IPO firms, in comparison to domestic IPOs. It is argued that foreign firms will face 
more severe information asymmetry problems when making themselves known to a foreign 
market investor community (Kadiyala & Subrahmanyam, 2000; Francis, Hasan, Lothian & 
Sun, 2008). These findings represent important research problems addressed in this thesis, 
leading up to the purpose outlined in the next section.  
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of certain firm-level corporate 
governance characteristics on the short-term performance (IPO underpricing) of foreign IPOs 
in the UK (LSE and AIM). 
 
On the one hand, the purpose of this thesis is to build on a restricted, but growing, number of 
studies carried out on the subject of foreign IPOs, contrasting much previous research on 
foreign equity listings where this particular group of companies have not until recently been 
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singled out as an unique target of research. Furthermore, this thesis has an important practical 
purpose. Industry practitioners and firm representatives are facing increasingly multifaceted 
listing decisions and call for practical guidance towards the best possible outcomes. This 
study aims to fill a gap of direct recommendations on firm-level corporate governance signals, 
by showing how specific components impact the performance and costs of conducting an IPO 
abroad.   
1.4 Research question 
In order to fulfil the purpose of this thesis, the following research question is asked: 
 
In what ways do the firm-level corporate governance characteristics board size, board 
independence, chairman independence and CEO/founder duality impact the short-term 
performance (IPO underpricing) of foreign IPOs? 
1.5 Demarcations  
In order to enhance the readers’ experience and understanding of this thesis, some 
demarcations and limitations are presented in order to exactly frame in the research objects. 
 
To fulfil the purpose of this thesis, IPOs by foreign firms on the UK stock markets LSE and 
AIM are studied. To simply talk about foreign IPOs requires a more detailed definition. 
Caglio et al. (2013) defines three different options when pursuing an international equity 
listing. The first option is to bypass the home market and go public on a foreign market, also 
known as a foreign IPO. The second option is to go public in the home market and in one or 
more foreign markets simultaneously, known as a global IPO. The third option is to go public 
at home and then cross-list either new or existing shares on a foreign market exchange, 
commonly referred to as cross-listings or international cross-listings. This study is directed 
exclusively towards option number one above, aligning with recent research conducted by 
Bell, Moore & Al-Shammari (2008) and Moore et al. (2010, 2012) to study strictly foreign 
IPOs. A clear distinction is important for the purpose of this study and to capture exactly the 
research problems presented earlier. For more in-depth foreign IPO distinctions, see section 
6.1.2, where the sample criteria are presented.  
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1.6 Thesis outline 
Directly following this introductory section is section 2, where important motives for foreign 
IPOs and foreign equity listings in general are presented. In section 3 the London stock 
markets (LSE and AIM) are introduced as the target markets for this study. Section 3 also 
serves to map out the regulatory framework for corporate governance in the UK. In section 4 
the theoretical framework for this thesis is established. This has the important purpose of 
building the foundation for the hypotheses that are presented at the end of section 4. In 
section 5 previous empirical findings are presented with the purpose of building an 
understanding for where this thesis adds knowledge. Section 6 will present the research 
method and statistical techniques used to test the hypotheses. The section includes 
information on how data is collected and processed into a final sample of foreign IPOs. In 
section 7 the empirical findings are presented, analysed and put into perspective using 
previous findings and underlying theory. Section 8 will be a conclusive section, split into two 
parts. The first part is a concluding discussion and the second part gives suggestions for 
interesting further research fields and possible extensions of this study.  
 
Section 2: Motives for Foreign IPOs 
Section 3: The UK Capital Markets and Legal Environment 
Section 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Section 5: Previous Empirical Findings 
Section 6: Method 
Section 7: Empirical Findings 
Section 8: Conclusion 
Section 9: References 
Section 10: Appendix 
Section 11: Article 
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2. Motives for Foreign IPOs 
This section gives a background to the fundamental reasons behind why firms go public 
abroad. It will present the reader with several important benefits of issuing initial equity on 
foreign capital markets. 
 
To fully understand the underlying theory behind foreign IPOs, it is important to briefly 
examine the strategic decision to list on a foreign stock exchange. The focus is to convey the 
most relevant motives and determinants of seeking initial equity capital away from home. 
Increased financial globalisation has in many respects compounded the comparative benefits 
of seeking to raise initial public equity abroad (Caglio et al., 2013).  
 
Some scholars discuss motives for foreign equity listings in terms of overcoming information 
asymmetries across national borders, and as a result internationalising the cost of capital 
(Oxelheim, 2000). The information gaps that a foreign equity listing seeks to close are often 
related to financial and commercial marketing (Oxelheim, 2000). Stulz (1999) argues that the 
resulting internationalisation of a firm’s shareholder base can improve risk sharing and lead to 
the benefit of a lower cost of capital. 
 
Furthermore, Pagano et al. (2002) discuss ten important motives for listing shares on a foreign 
exchange, presented in table 1 below. The motives are originally discussed in a general 
context of foreign equity listings, hence without the important distinctions outlined in section 
1.5. The motives, however, are argued to be extra relevant in cases where additional (new) 
capital is raised and significant financial constraints exist in the firms’ home markets (Pagano 
et al., 2002). Therefore, the benefits stand out as highly relevant motivations for foreign IPO 
activity when exclusively new equity is issued and firms increasingly tend to originate from 
emerging economies (Bruner et al., 2006; PWC, 2012).  
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Table 1. Ten important motives for foreign equity listings 
Motive for foreign listing Explanation  
1.  Raising capital for investment The most important underlying motive. Especially for firms in 
high growth in need of new capital to fund investments. Extra 
motivated if debt capacity is limited and price to earnings 
value is high. 
2.  Stock sales by existing shareholders Common motive for newly privatised firms without special 
investment needs. Going abroad might increase the value of 
the shareholders stakes. 
3.  Broadening shareholders’ base High risk firms might see reasons to broaden the shareholder 
base. Initial shareholders might see a need to spread risk onto 
new owners, and potentially lowering the cost of capital. 
4.  Foreign expertise Common in high-tech sector, and among firms with large 
R&D spending, to access analysts with expert knowledge of 
the specific industry.  
5.  Commitment to disclosure and 
governance standards 
This motive is especially relevant to firms from countries with 
low domestic regulatory standards. Commitment to higher 
standards abroad can send positive signals and possibly lower 
cost of capital. 
6.  Liquidity Access to more liquid markets from for example entering a 
market with better microstructure. 
7.  Relative mispricing Capitalising on a temporary high price of the firms’ shares on 
a foreign exchange, in relation to the home market.  
8.  Capitalising on product market 
reputation 
High fraction of foreign sales might lead to benefits of listing 
where local investors are already consumers, especially 
relevant in consumer products. 
9.  Strengthen the company’s output market Product market competitors are already listed on the same 
exchange. As opposed to the previous, the firm lists where 
potential for an increase in foreign sales exist, not where it 
already exists. 
10.  Listing costs are low relative to benefits Listing abroad is associated with high costs; therefore larger 
firms should be more likely to have higher benefits than costs.  
Source: Pagano, Roell, & Zechner (2002). 
 
In an extensive study, covering a global sample of IPOs, Caglio et al. (2013) study 
determinants of going public abroad. In line with Pagano et al. (2002) and the ten stated 
motives behind foreign equity listings, the authors find that companies going public abroad do 
so in order to bypass information frictions and maximise the amount raised at the IPO. 
Another stated determinant include findings that foreign IPO firms largely come out of 
countries with few recent IPOs by industry peers and lower disclosure standards. The search 
for more developed capital markets is another important determinant. In contrast to Pagano et 
al. (2002), Caglio et al. (2013) stress the importance of making a distinction between firms 
15 
 
doing an IPO abroad and firms going public at home first and then subsequently cross-list on 
a foreign exchange.  
 
In line with the purpose of this section, motives and possible advantages of foreign equity 
listings are presented. Nevertheless, foreign equity listings are associated with high costs and 
possible disadvantages. Possibly high costs for foreign equity issuers include listing fees, 
professional advisory services and compliances with foreign regulatory standards (Pagano et 
al., 2002).  
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3. The UK capital markets and legal environment 
The third section introduces the London stock exchange (LSE and AIM) as the target market 
for this study.  The section seeks to explain the regulatory environment for IPOs on the LSE. 
Moreover, the section discusses UK corporate governance regulations and its contrasting 
features to the US.    
 
For the purpose of understanding the environment that meets foreign firms when listing on the 
LSE, this chapter initially maps out some important aspects of London as a destination for 
foreign IPOs. To fully comprehend the examined effects of having certain internal corporate 
governance arrangements on foreign IPO performance, the legal boundaries are outlined and 
put into perspective. This section has a special focus on corporate governance related 
regulations in the UK, shown to include important and unique characteristics. The special 
properties of the UK legal environment offer an interesting setting to study firm-level 
corporate governance characteristics of foreign IPO firms (Moore et al., 2012). 
3.1 The London stock exchange 
Founded more than 200 years ago, the LSE is one of the oldest and most important financial 
institutions in the world. The LSE consists of the main market and the AIM, which was 
founded later, in 1995 (London Stock Exchange, 2014). At the end of year 2011, the number 
of listed companies on the LSE was 2886, and 598 of these originated from outside the UK. 
The foreign firms on the LSE at the end of year 2011 represent 20.7 percent of the total 
number of listed corporations in comparison to 16.3 percent for the New York stock 
exchanges (Nasdaq and NYSE) at the same time (PWC, 2012). Between the years 2002 and 
2011, 41 percent of all cross-border IPOs, worldwide, were targeted at the London capital 
markets. During the same time period, foreign firms raised more capital than domestic UK 
firms (PWC, 2012). These figures make the LSE one of the most diverse and international 
stock markets in the world. 
3.2 Regulatory framework and UK corporate governance code 
The regulatory framework for foreign (and domestic) firms seeking to list on the LSE differs 
if the firm wishes to go through with a standard or a premium equity listing (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010). This study includes firms from both categories, and it is important to 
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highlight the distinction since firms that are standard listed are not obliged to follow the UK 
combined code for corporate governance. Because of its obvious implications for foreign IPO 
firms’ firm-level corporate governance arrangements, the UK corporate governance code is 
discussed and specified further below. 
 
A framework for corporate governance code started to develop in the early 1990s in the UK. 
At the time, the framework consisted of a series of reports, stating corporate governance 
related recommendations (Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998). Founded on recommendations in 
these reports, a combined code on corporate governance (the code) was first given out by the 
Financial Reporting Council in 1998 (Filatotchev, Jackson, Gospel & Allcock, 2007). Since 
1998, the code is published regularly and is divided into five subgroups: leadership, 
effectiveness, accountability, remuneration, and relations to shareholders (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012). UK corporate governance code takes a voluntary approach and is enforced 
only through a comply-or-explain system. Non-compliances with the corporate governance 
code have to be accounted for in annual reports or in the case of IPOs, in IPO prospectuses or 
in admission documents
3
 (Guest, 2008). The “soft” nature of the UK combined code gives 
corporations in the UK enhanced freedom to structure their own boards and do not have to 
make potentially weakening compromises (Guest, 2008). One argued problem with the code 
is the fact that non-compliances, and the explanations behind them, are not always effectively 
communicated to investors. It is argued that the flexibility inherent to the code is only 
effective when investors are able to interpret companies’ decisions to not comply (Filatotchev 
et al., 2007). Guest (2008) shows evidence that the code does have a significant impact on 
board structures in the UK, but also concludes that many companies use their right to not 
comply.  
 
The voluntary nature of UK corporate governance code is contrasted to the mandatory 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) in the US that came into effect in 2002 
(Guest, 2008). SOA offers regulations on corporate governance and disclosure standards for 
public corporations in the US (Moore et al., 2010). Non-compliance with the “hard laws” of 
the SOA can be costly and its legislative power covers domestic as well as foreign public 
firms (Moore et al., 2012). The UK and US share a common law legal system and tradition, 
and are similar with regards to, for example, dispersed ownership and high investor protection 
                                                 
3
 Admission documents are from now on included in the term IPO prospectus. 
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(La porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Schleifer & Vishny, 1998). Scholars have let room to argue for 
diverging tendencies within civil law traditions, but less attention has been paid to differences 
within common law (Moore et al., 2010). Even though the US and UK share common law 
legal traditions, there are important differences when looking at legal regulation and self-
regulation (Moore et al., 2010).  
 
According to Guest (2008), the two systems differ in several aspects. These include 
enforcement of directors’ legal duties, board structure, roles of institutional investors and as 
mentioned above, diverging approaches of the corporate governance reforms. Scholars 
sometimes link the voluntary nature of the UK system to the presence of “gentlemanly 
capitalism” (Currie, 1979). “Gentlemanly capitalism” promotes an informal institutional 
environment where individuals act collectively to establish norms and codes of practice, 
managed through ties between networks, influential individuals and organisations (Moore et 
al., 2012). To overcome information asymmetry problems usually connected with IPOs, it is 
argued that a mandatory approach to corporate governance regulations could be more 
efficient. Bebchuck (2002) argues that firms’ corporate governance decisions are not 
appropriately steered entirely by market mechanisms. As mentioned above, the flexibilities 
inherent to the UK corporate governance regulations might only be of use, and be of overall 
good, if the public can observe deviation from the code (Filatotchev et al, 2007).     
 
Comparative features of corporate governance systems is not the focus of this study, but are 
presented for the purpose of introducing the legal environment and to give understanding of 
the UK corporate governance context.  
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4.    Theoretical Framework and hypotheses 
 This section gives a theoretical background and foundation to the concepts that this thesis is 
based upon. The theory and concepts presented in this section boil down to four hypotheses, 
presented in connection to their respective theoretical concept. The section concludes with a 
compilation of the hypothesis investigated in this thesis. 
 
Much of the theory that is presented in this section is deduced from traditional IPO literature 
on domestic IPO samples, screened for relevance in a foreign IPO setting. The first section 
introduces the subject for explanation in this thesis, IPO underpricing, with regards to 
underlying theory, evidence and firm-level implications. The following section maps out the 
IPO context by presenting information asymmetry and adverse selection theories. Signaling 
theory is presented as a direct response to costs arising from asymmetric information between 
the three main stakeholders in an IPO: the issuing firm, the underwriting investment bank and 
the outside investors (Ljungqvist, 2007). Signaling theory is applied to four internal corporate 
governance characteristics, directly derived from four concepts within corporate governance 
literature. The hypotheses are stated in direct relation to the respective corporate governance 
concept. 
4.1 IPO Underpricing 
IPO underpricing, along with “hot issue” markets and long-run underperformance, are three 
empirically documented and widely accepted characteristics of IPOs (Ritter, 1998). As a 
measure, IPO underpricing is intuitive, basically capturing the percentage difference between 
opening price and closing price for a new equity issue (Certo et al., 2001). Additionally, IPO 
underpricing is sometimes presented as the monetary value of the one day stock price 
difference, computed as the first day price increase multiplied by the number of shares offered 
(Loughran & Ritter, 2002).  The phenomenon IPO underpricing is, however, complex and has 
been the subject of much speculation (Tinic, 1988). The reasons behind underpricing are 
heavily debated and make way for multiple theoretical explanations, many of which are not 
proven empirically. The most common theoretical explanations behind IPO underpricing, as 
stated by Tinic (1988) and Ritter (1998), are compiled and briefly explained in table 2. 
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Table 2 Ten common theoretical explanations for IPO underpricing 
Reasons for underpricing Explanation 
1. The winner's curse hypothesis The winner’s curse means that less informed investors only 
will get the number of shares desired in overpriced IPOs, or in 
other words less favourable IPOs, and might therefore stop 
investing their money. In order to attract the less informed 
investors to participate in the subscription of the IPO, the firm 
and underwriter might underprice the IPO to create a larger 
shareholder base.  
 
2. The market feedback hypothesis In order to get information from investors, the investment bank 
intentionally underprices new issues. Compensation to 
investors for revealing their valuations is subsequently given in 
the form of underpriced IPOs. 
3. The bandwagon hypothesis Investment banks underprice new issues to create a reaction 
among investors. If the stock is underpriced, it will generate 
attention and lead investors to buy, sometimes regardless of 
their own interpretations. 
4. The investment banker's monopsony 
power hypothesis 
Bargaining power of investment banks, against especially 
smaller speculative firms and start-ups, is used to intentionally 
underprice new issues. The hot new issues are then offered to 
important, "favoured" clients, as means of marketing or to 
strengthen client ties.  
5. The lawsuit avoidance hypothesis Participants of the IPO underprice the new issue in order to 
mitigate the risk of a potentially costly lawsuit because of 
untruthful information stated in the prospectus. Shares in less 
regulated environments however, have not been shown to be 
less underpriced. 
6. The signaling hypothesis Issuers, according to this hypothesis, underprice their new 
issue in order to spark high demand and to be able to price later 
offerings at a higher price.  
7. The ownership dispersion hypothesis Issuers underprice their shares in order to attract many 
investors and increase ownership dispersion. The increased 
dispersion will lead to a more liquid market and a situation 
where it is harder to collectively challenge the management.  
8. Speculative bubble hypothesis Speculative investors that did not get to buy the shares at 
listing because of oversubscription instead buy in the 
aftermarket, leading prices to rise above the fair value that they 
were priced at the time of the IPO. There is no empirical 
evidence of this theory to date, despite some attempts.  
9. Asymmetric information hypothesis The hypothesis is divided into two categories, one where 
underpricing is caused by information discrepancies between 
the investment banker and the issuer (Baron & Holmstrom, 
1982) and another that focuses on the relationship between 
informed and uninformed investors (Rock, 1986). Information 
asymmetry between the involved parties causes a mispricing of 
the new issue. 
10. Risk-averse underwriter hypothesis Based on a proposed risk-aversion on the part of the 
underwriter where the investment bank would underprice a 
new equity issue in order to reduce price related risks and 
costs. Simply to avoid unsuccessful listings and to secure the 
selling of the shares.  
Source: Tinic (1988) and Ritter (1998) 
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Relying on the classification of Ljungqvist (2007), IPO underpricing theory can be divided 
into four main sub categories: information asymmetry, institutional reasons, control 
considerations and behavioural approaches. The idea that IPO underpricing, in some way, is a 
consequence of information frictions is well supported (Ljungqvist, 2007). As a response to 
this, and to fulfil the purpose of this study, theoretical explanations for underpricing with a 
foundation in information asymmetry problems will be given disproportionate attention.   
4.1.1 Evidence of underpricing 
According to almost unanimous empirical evidence, new equity issues are systematically 
mispriced and on average encounter an upswing in stock price during the first day of trading 
(Ibbotson, 1975; Tinic, 1988). Underpricing as a phenomenon is well established, explained 
to occur with “remarkable empirical regularity” (Ljungqvist, 2007 s. 378).  Average levels of 
underpricing have been shown to differ over time, historically displaying strong cyclical 
patterns. Evidence of abnormal returns on the first day of trading exists on every stock 
exchange, and in every country around the world, as shown in figure 2 below (Ritter, 1998).   
 
Figure 2. Domestic IPO underpricing evidence from various markets.  
 
Source: Ritter (1998) 
 
22 
 
Apart from the evidence of domestic IPO underpricing, a more restricted number of studies 
on foreign IPOs have shown evidence of a systematic underpricing. Bruner, Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2004) show that foreign IPOs in the US, when compared to their domestic 
counterparts, do not on average incur higher listing costs, with underpricing being one such 
cost. The same authors argue that the strict listing requirements of the US, along with other 
aspects, predominantly attract larger, less risky firms and thereby compensate for problems 
related to being a foreign firm. Blass and Yafeh (2001) found initial underpricing of 20 
percent for Israeli firms going public in the US compared to domestic Israeli IPOs, where 
underpricing was almost non-existent. Bell et al. (2008) found an average mispricing of 71 
percent for foreign IPOs listing in the US between 1997 and 2004. Moore et al. (2010) found 
an average IPO underpricing of around 50 percent for a sample of foreign firms listed for the 
first time in the UK and US between year 2002 and 2006. The two latter indicate rather grave 
mispricing issues when compared to similar studies on domestic IPOs within approximately 
the same time frame (see Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Some scholars 
suggest it, but evidence that underpricing is more severe for foreign firms compared to 
domestic is not entirely conclusive. 
4.1.2 Taking a firm level perspective 
For the firm, and its original shareholders, the first day upswing in price can be regarded as 
“money left on the table” (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). As stated previously, initial IPO 
underpricing is a well-documented occurrence, leading to a situation where the “money left 
on the table” is regarded as a predetermined cost of going public (Ogden, Frank & O’connor, 
2002). IPO underpricing has not been empirically concluded upon as either a negative or a 
positive phenomenon, evident also from the diverging theoretical reasoning in section 4.1.  
 
The argumentation varies much depending on which stakeholder perspective is considered 
(Certo et al., 2001). Three perspectives are commonly investigated in IPO underpricing 
literature: the issuing firm, the underwriting investment bank and the public investors 
(Ljungqvist, 2007). All three stakeholders are obviously affected differently by IPO 
underpricing, leading to a delicate situation of diverging interests, which is not always easily 
understood. The initial shareholders can both suffer and benefit from underpricing if their 
entire stake in the company is not sold at the time of the IPO, allowing them to capitalise on 
the initial price upswing (Certo et al., 2001).  
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A natural consequence of our focus on firm-level corporate governance and in order to fulfil 
the purpose of this study, this thesis is aligned with Certo et al. (2001) in seeing initial stock 
underpricing as a case of unretained shareholder wealth. IPO underpricing is seen as a direct 
transfer of wealth from the original owners of the firm to the new first-day investor base 
(Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002).  
 
The difference between the issuing price and the first day closing price, or the value of the 
unretained wealth, can potentially be substantial. Moore et al. (2010), for example, find an 
average unretained value of $13 million for a sample of foreign IPOs listing on the US and 
UK stock exchanges between the years 2002 and 2006. Loughran and Ritter (2000) find an 
average unretained value of $9 million, arguing that this amount is twice as much as the 
average underwriting fees. 
 
With the theoretical foundation and documented evidence of IPO underpricing put forward, 
the following section introduces information asymmetry and adverse selection as a theoretical 
framework when understanding foreign IPOs. Implications related to these issues are proxied 
by studying IPO underpricing, since this study highlights that much of the theoretical 
explanations for IPO underpricing can be found by looking closer at information asymmetries 
and adverse selection costs (Ljungqvist, 2007). Less foreign IPO underpricing is seen as 
positive from the company’s point of view and a sign of less severe information asymmetry 
problems. To frame the following context is important to fully see the potential effects and 
signaling properties of specific corporate governance arrangements on foreign IPO 
performance.  
4.2 Information asymmetry and adverse selection 
At the heart of the issues surrounding IPO underpricing are theories of asymmetric 
information. Levels of information frictions are even argued to be important for the decision 
to issue equity at all, as opposed to taking on debt (Myers & Majluf, 1984), but that is an 
entirely different story. The IPO offers a unique event for which information asymmetry 
problems are investigated (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). As noted above, three key actors in 
IPOs are commonly investigated: the issuing firm, the investment bank serving as a marketer 
and underwriter of the IPO and the public investors (Ljungqvist, 2007). Two relationships 
among these are typically in focus (Tinic, 1988). The first is the relationship between 
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informed and uninformed investor groups, basically saying that some investors hold superior 
information compared to the average investor, or even to the issuing firm or the investment 
bank (Rock, 1986). The other relationship commonly in focus is between the issuing firm and 
the investment bank. With ideas stemming from agency theory, it is argued that the 
investment bank draws advantages from holding superior information on market demand for 
new securities (Baron, 1982). 
 
Akerlof (1970) sets the tone for the underlying idea behind information asymmetry problems, 
using a well-known car market analogy to show how buyers (investors) often find themselves 
suffering from an informational disadvantage towards the more informed sellers (issuers). 
When the situation of asymmetric information leads to undesired results, such as unretained 
wealth at the time of the IPO, this is commonly referred to as adverse selection costs (Akerlof, 
1970; Leite, 2007). Information asymmetries arguably exist in every market, but appear 
especially pronounced in financial markets (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Moreover, issuing firm 
insiders are said to possess information about the true value of the firm and its operations that 
outside investors cannot access, leading insiders to value the firm closer to its true value 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Building on Akerlof’s theory (1970), Healy & Palepu (2001) 
construct a situation where only two types of ideas exist, “good” and “bad”. If information 
asymmetries leave investors unable to distinguish between “good” and “bad” ideas, the two 
ideas might end up equally priced by the capital markets, logically leading to an aftermarket 
increase of securities issued by “good” idea firms, reinforcing an equilibrium relationship 
between supply and demand. Direct adverse selection costs of going public have been 
measured as the difference between the maximum possible IPO proceeds in front of equally 
uninformed investors and the expected proceeds in front of unequally informed investors 
(Leite, 2007). 
 
Firms going public typically have limited operational track records, and as an effect of having 
been privately held have given out very little public information about previous performance. 
This “liability of newness” puts a strain on information asymmetries between the firm and 
market actors (Moore et al., 2010). Francis et al. (2008) share this view and claim that foreign 
IPOs commonly encounter more severe information asymmetry than their domestic 
counterparts. Furthermore, Moore et al. (2010) argue that for foreign IPO firms a dimension 
of “liability of foreignness” is added to the equation, further complicating problems of 
information asymmetry. Firms seeking to access foreign markets will need to hold firm-level 
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advantages to compensate for liabilities of being foreign (Petersen & Pedersen, 2000). Francis 
et al. (2008) refer to Bruner, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (1999) when making the point that 
foreign firms face a tougher task in making themselves known to the investor community of 
the host market. Information asymmetries for foreign firms are increased by factors such as 
language, culture, institutions and analyst coverage (Bruner et al., 2006). Higher levels of 
asymmetric information associated with foreign IPOs should cause higher levels initial 
underpricing (Kadiyala & Subrahmanyam, 2000). The combined problems of information 
asymmetry generally associated with IPOs and varying degrees of “foreignness” and cross-
border differences make foreign IPOs interesting research targets. 
 
As noted in the beginning of section 4.1.2, underpricing can be seen as an undesirable 
consequence of going public. Underpricing can arguably be reduced by limiting the degree of 
information asymmetry and adverse selection costs arising from heterogeneous information 
between informed and uninformed investors (Ljungqvist, 2007). The incentives would then be 
to tackle the informational frictions argued to be exacerbated in the context of foreign IPOs. 
The following section introduces signaling theory as a response to these problems. 
4.3 Signaling theory 
A dominant theoretical application to problems associated with information asymmetry and 
adverse selection is signaling theory (Moore et al., 2010). This thesis extends domestic IPO 
research where signaling theory serves as the theoretical foundation (Certo et al., 2001; 
Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Signaling theory, as it is referred to here, must not be mixed 
with a specific theory behind IPO underpricing under the same name (see table 2, section 4.1). 
The previous section presented the problems of domestic and foreign IPOs predominantly as a 
result of information asymmetries between involved stakeholders. Signaling theory arises 
from the direct need to bridge asymmetric information problems (Spence, 1973).  
 
Using a well-cited job market example, Spence (1973) successfully communicates the basic 
mechanisms of how a “high quality” job applicant will have to send signals to the potential 
employer in order to separate him or herself from “low quality” applicants, where one such 
signal could be a good education. Moreover, Ross (1977) finds that in order for a signal to be 
effective, it has to be observable and difficult and/or costly to replicate. In short, signaling 
theory constitutes the manner by which decision-makers bridge information asymmetry 
26 
 
problems and costs (Spence, 1973). Leland and Pyle (1977) call the signals information 
transfers and state that “high quality projects” must initiate such transfers. Entrepreneurs 
seeking to raise capital can benefit from informational transfers if the actions they take are 
observable (Leland & Pyle, 1977).  
 
Asymmetric information in an IPO context makes way for potentially harmful agency costs, 
arising between the three main stakeholders: the issuing firm, the underwriting investment 
bank and the outside investor community (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). To avoid mispricing 
at the IPO, the firm will have to take actions in order to show its true value (Certo, 2003). The 
signals sent out by the issuing firm at the IPO, directed towards both the underwriter and the 
public investors, will have to be difficult for other firms to imitate (Filatotchev & Bishop., 
2002). To avoid imitations from “lower quality” firms, the IPO firm will have to make sure 
that the signals are observed and well understood by the receiving ends (Certo, 2003). Many 
signals have been previously observed to play important roles at the event of an IPO (see 
Moore et al., 2010). Theoretical indications suggest that successful signals could be derived 
from firm-level corporate governance characteristics (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002).   
 
In the light of the previous discussion, and in order to fulfil the purpose of this thesis, four 
firm-level corporate concepts are proposed in the next section. The four concepts make up 
propositions for firm-level signals, aimed at mitigating information asymmetries, adverse 
selection costs and agency costs, arising from the relationships between the foreign firm, the 
investment bank and the host market investor community. As a consequence of the previous 
sections, these relationships are argued to be especially hard to manage in a foreign IPO 
setting.  
4.4 Firm-level corporate governance 
In order to complete the theoretical framework needed to answer the research question and 
fulfil the purpose of this study, four firm-level corporate governance perspectives are 
introduced theoretically. The four internal corporate governance perspectives, and proposals 
for signaling theory applications onto foreign IPO performance, are: board size, board 
independence, chairman independency and CEO/founder duality. Based on previously 
introduced theoretical context, and upcoming concept specific discussions, hypotheses are 
presented in alignment with the following four sections.  
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4.4.1 Board Size   
The board of directors is arguably the most important part of a firms internal control system, 
and problems stemming from flawed internal corporate governance most commonly start with 
the board (Jensen, 1993). Theory on how board size might cause problems is typically divided 
according to two main sources: communication and coordination problems in large groups 
and agency conflicts where the board fails in its controlling role over firm management 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998). Jensen (1993) recognise that one important aspect of 
the composition of the board is its size, and that keeping a board small can help to increase 
board performance and quality of decision making within the board. A larger board might 
also be easier for a CEO to control, undermining the importance of the board as an internal 
control organ (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, aligned with boards’ important role within the 
internal control system is its proposed responsibility to monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) take the same side and argue that a board consisting 
of more than ten members is a major threat to the effectiveness of its decision-making. If the 
board is too large and in the presence of time constraints, all board members might not be 
given sufficient space to express their opinions (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  
 
A smaller board would presumably lead to better decision-making, allowing all directors to 
contribute and reach a consensus (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). A well-cited report by Yermack 
and Shivdasani (1999) do provide empirical evidence of smaller boards being more effective, 
showing a negative relationship between board size and firm value. Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
document the same relationship for small and medium sized firms in Finland. An agency 
conflict perspective can be applied to board size, claiming that free-riding problems within 
boards increase with the number of board members, potentially rendering a more symbolic 
board taking less responsibilities when it comes to managing the firm and controlling the 
management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). This in turn might lead the management team to 
become too powerful in terms of decision power, with increased agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders as a natural consequence (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Hearn 
(2010) supports the view of Hermalin and Weisbach and claims that larger boards increase the 
information asymmetry and lead to lack of coordination. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), 
claim to see a consensus among researchers saying that smaller boards carry out monitoring 
more effectively. This is however contradicted by some scholars referring to resource 
dependence theories, saying that board size could reflect the extent to which a firm is able to 
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ensure critical external ties and secure vital resources (Filatotchev et al., 2007). In line with 
this and contrary to previous statements, lie arguments that larger boards are better at 
monitoring, since a larger board should be harder for a CEO to dominate and more effective, 
coming from arguments that a larger board is a more heterogeneous board (Zahra & Pearson, 
1989).  
 
The theories on board size are shown to go in several directions. However, empirical findings 
do show that smaller boards can be more effective. Arguments that larger boards can become 
diffuse and subject to harmful agency costs could prove problematic for a foreign IPO firm. A 
possible situation where the board no longer has the power to prevent underpricing on behalf 
of shareholders leads up to the hypothesis below.   
Hypothesis 1: A larger board size is positively associated with foreign IPO underpricing 
4.4.2 Board independence  
For a clarification of the concepts and operationalizations of board independence, this thesis 
refers to Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) for the separation between inside board 
members, outside board members, affiliated board members and independent board members. 
Inside directors are defined as having operational responsibilities, such as management 
positions within the firm, therefore potentially limiting their abilities to fill important 
functions. Outside directors are defined as not being directly employed by the firm and not 
having any professional or personal ties to the firm or its management. This definition is in 
line with the independency criteria used in this thesis, further specified in section 6.3.2. An 
affiliated director is defined as not being a firm executive, but nonetheless remaining in some 
form of personal or professional relationship with the firm and/or its management. The 
concept of an independent director is according to Dalton et al. (1998) a director who follows 
the criteria of an outside director, but with the extension of having been appointed before the 
current CEO of the firm. The distinctions are of importance for the upcoming section, and 
help when grasping the literature and complications of independently functioning boards or 
board members.  
   
Research on the subject of board independence, and whether it has any real impact on firm 
performance, is mixed (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). Despite this, some scholars do claim that 
a semi-strong consensus is present around the proposition that a higher relative share of 
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outside directors on the board is equivalent to a more effective board (Dalton et al., 1998). 
The notion of having a board comprise of exclusively outside directors is often supported by 
practitioners (Dalton et al., 1998). Furthermore, Jensen (1993) argues that the only insider 
who should possess a permanent position on the board is the CEO. Opinions are often 
contingent on a few different underlying theoretical perspectives. Scholarly support for boards 
with a high proportion of outsiders commonly take a stand in agency theory, focusing on the 
balance between the owners of the firm and those in control of it, namely management and 
the CEO (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). The independent director is supposed 
to function as a financially accountable middleman, ensuring that interests of residual 
claimants (shareholders) are satisfied and not violated (Buckland, 2001). In order to control 
and monitor management, and to steer them away from actions that could potentially damage 
the firm and shareholder value, outside directors fill a vital function on the firm’s board 
(Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). Outside directors, separated from the interests of 
management, are in that situation argued to potentially improve firm performance (Dalton et 
al., 1998).  
 
Certo et al. (2001) discuss the relevance of the agency theory perspective of board 
independence in the context of IPOs. The same authors make the point that the importance of 
outside directors, with regards to controlling management and specifically management’s use 
of excess funds, may not be as relevant among IPO firms, who actually often sell shares 
because of a shortage of capital to fund growth or further investments. It is argued that 
potential investors in IPO firms instead value an emphasis on strategic direction, perhaps 
better delivered by insiders who typically hold in depth firm-specific information (Certo et al., 
2001). In an IPO context, that would then contrast previously stated suggestions of boards 
consisting entirely, or almost entirely, of outside directors.  
 
Another common justification for high involvement of outside directors is linked with 
resource acquisition (Certo et al., 2001). Resource dependence theory views outside directors 
as a necessary link with external market participants (Dalton et al., 1998). Including a high 
share of outside directors, with ability to secure external connections and expertise, could 
possibly be beneficial in an IPO context, where firms are typically young, small and 
especially vulnerable to poor decisions by management (Certo et al., 2001). Having 
competencies to secure resources and provide expertise on the board may be of enhanced 
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importance for diverse firms operating in complex international environments (Dalton et al., 
1998).    
 
In the light of diverging theoretical viewpoints, the perceived importance of external 
connections and expertise when going public on a foreign market contributes to the 
hypothesis below. Furthermore, independent directors’ incentives are argued to be more 
aligned with residual claimants’ interests. Based on the previous discussion, it can therefore 
be argued that independent board members should be concerned with foreign IPO 
underpricing. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher proportions of independent board members are negatively associated 
with foreign IPO underpricing 
4.4.3 Independent chairman 
Turning the discussion to the independency of the chairman of the board, it is important to 
acknowledge that much of the argumentation mentioned in the previous section is transferred 
onto the basic requirements of an independent chairman. Jensen (1993) makes the point that 
appointing an outsider as chairman can offer relief to the rest of the board, coming from the 
notion that the rest of the board can then pass on much of the monitoring tasks onto the 
chairman, who is then more likely to have such interests. 
 
The more part of research on chairman independence focuses on CEO and chairman duality, 
and the argumentation that such a duality can severely hinder the effectiveness of the board in 
fulfilling its monitoring functions towards the shareholders (Filatotchev et al, 2007). Hart 
(1995) takes position in the fact that UK corporate governance regulations says that a duality 
“should” not be in place for public companies in the UK, and makes the point that boards with 
an independent chairman arguably more effectively fill their purpose. It is argued that a 
chairman with no current or previous commitments within the firm’s management function is 
arguably more likely to properly align with the interests of shareholders (Coles & Hesterly, 
2000). If so, an independent chairman should be concerned with foreign IPO underpricing, 
previously identified as a cost of going public to the initial shareholders of the firm. This 
argumentation leads up to the third hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: Having an independent chairman is negatively associated with foreign IPO 
underpricing 
4.4.4 CEO/Founder duality 
According to Certo et al. (2001) founders who remain as CEOs when transforming the firm 
into publicly owned, could constitute both untested and inexperienced firm management. If 
these characteristics are present, that might cause more severe information asymmetries 
between the firm and the underwriter, as well as between the underwriter and the outside 
investors (Certo et al., 2001).  
 
On the one hand, scholars have found multiple reasons for why a founder should have skills 
and hold incentives that logically lead to better firm performance and to more effective 
decision-making (Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling & Covin, 2000). The argument is that a 
founder should be more prone to put effort into ensuring the success of the firm, stemming 
from for example higher personal stakes in the firm. Jayaraman et al. (2000) refer to evidence 
of higher risk taking characteristics, along with a deeper need for achievement, found among 
founder CEOs. They argue that such risk taking could unlock stronger firm performance over 
time. On the other hand, these founder CEO characteristics are argued to lead to a higher 
information asymmetry between the issuing firm and underwriter, causing risks of higher 
underpricing (Certo et al., 2001). A relationship between founder-led IPO firms and 
underpricing that has been proven to hold in a US context, for domestic IPOs (Certo et al., 
2001).  
 
Another cause for concern is also a possible discrepancy between how the underwriter 
evaluates a founder as CEO and how an outside investor would generally look at an 
entrepreneur leading the firm (Certo et al., 2001). Founders leading their own firms might be 
suffering from extreme overoptimism (Cooper, Dunkelberg & Woo, 1998). Underwriting 
investment banks can be argued to view objectivity problems linked with optimistic founders 
more cynically than for example outside investors, who tend to look positively on successful 
entrepreneurs (Certo et al., 2001). In addition, Moore et al (2012) claim that the CEO/founder 
duality might be priced higher and received with less scepticism in the UK than in the US, 
partly due to the stricter regulatory corporate governance environment present in the US. 
Even so, in accordance with underpricing theory, risk-averse tendencies among underwriters 
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might lead them to set a lower price on firms where they are concerned about uncertainties 
regarding the incentives and mind-set of the CEO and/or firm management (Tinic, 1988), 
leading to hypothesis number four. 
Hypothesis 4: CEO/founder duality is positively associated with foreign IPO underpricing  
4.5 Hypotheses 
H0:  There is no relationship between the independent variable and foreign IPO underpricing 
H1: A larger board size is positively associated with foreign IPO underpricing  
H2: Higher proportions of independent board members are negatively associated with foreign 
IPO underpricing  
H3: Having an independent chairman is negatively associated with foreign IPO underpricing 
H4: CEO/founder duality is positively associated with foreign IPO underpricing  
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5.  Previous empirical findings 
This fifth section presents the reader with brief presentations of the key empirical findings of 
two studies on domestic IPOs that this thesis is heavily influenced by. Following that, reviews 
of relevant previous empirical studies on foreign IPOs are given.   
5.1 Domestic IPOs 
Certo et al. (2001) study IPO underpricing for a large sample of domestic US IPOs between 
the years 1990 to 1998. The study focuses on the effects of being a founder-managed firm on 
IPO undepricing. IPO underpricing is viewed from the perspective of the firm, and its original 
owners, regarded as unretained shareholder wealth. The findings suggest that founder-led 
firms in the US are on average more underpriced than their non-founder-managed 
counterparts. It is also shown that the extent of IPO underpricing among founder-led firms is 
moderated (decreased) by two properties: the market share of the investment bank in charge 
of the underwriting and the share of “insider” directors on the firms’ board.  
 
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) carry out a similar study, using a sample of domestic UK IPOs 
between the years 1999 and 2000. The study investigates the effects of board composition and 
share ownership structures on IPO underpricing. IPO underpricing is seen as a wealth transfer 
from the firm to the first-day investors. The study investigates what endogenously chosen 
board characteristics are important to reduce IPO underpricing. The findings support causality 
between a high proportion of non-executive directors and lower levels of IPO underpricing.  
5.2 Foreign IPOs 
Kadiyala and Subrahmanyam (2002) study a sample of foreign firms going public on the US 
market between the years 1996 and 2000. The authors investigate IPOs as well as seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). Average underpricing for the foreign IPOs is shown to be 18.75 %. 
The results show that firms listed on NASDAQ suffer from larger IPO underpricing than 
companies listed on NYSE/AMEX. The authors explain that difference in underpricing as 
caused by higher disclosure standards on the NYSE stock exchange. The authors conclude 
that SEOs are less underpriced than IPOs due to reduced information asymmetry between 
outside investors and the firm. Kadiyala and Subrahmanyam (2002) show that high-tech firms 
are more underpriced than others due to difficulties setting the true value. 
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Bruner et al. (2004) studies IPOs in the US between the years 1991 and 1999, comparing 
domestic IPOs with cross-border listings. The study focuses on issuing costs or more 
particularly underwriting fees and underpricing costs. The authors take a stand in the notion 
that high country risks and information gaps between issuing firms and the host market incur 
higher costs on foreign firms seeking to raise capital on a US market. Their findings suggest 
that foreign issuers carry on average the same costs as domestic issuers. This is explained by 
certain characteristics of the foreign issuers that cancel out some of the involved risks. 
Observed characteristics of the foreign issuers involve a large size, with a large pool of 
tangible assets, usually coming from a home market equity listing and strong stock 
performance at home. Bruner et al. (2006) add to these findings concluding that there is no 
significant difference in issuing costs between firms originating from emerging markets as 
opposed to developed markets when listing in the US. Furthermore, the additional country 
risks and information gaps are bridged by the fact that these firms share certain characteristics 
of being large, from stable industries (less high-tech) and with previous strong performance in 
the home market.     
 
Francis et al. (2008) carry out a study investigating if foreign IPO underpricing may depend 
on the underpricing theory of signaling. The study is based on 413 IPOs between the years 
1985 to 2000, with a follow up of 70 SEOs (SEOs made within three years after the IPO). The 
study shows significant differences between companies originating from integrated compared 
to segmented financial markets. The results show that the companies originating from 
segmented financial markets tend to be more underpriced. The empirical findings show that 
the most underpriced companies more commonly issue SEOs within a shorter time of the 
IPO, and also suffer from smaller price drops at the announcement of the SEO. 
 
Bell et al. (2008) study a sample of foreign IPO firms listing in the US between the years 
1997 and 2004, investigating the impact of country of origin on the IPO underpricing. The 
findings include that firms originating from countries with higher levels of economic 
freedom, measured on an institutional and macroeconomic level, experience significantly less 
underpricing at the time of the foreign IPO. They further show that a foreign firm’s 
communicated legitimacy, resulting in a better IPO performance, is linked with previous 
international presence and also with the firm owners’ decision to retain a respectable share in 
the company after the listing.           
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Moore et al. (2010) study a sample of foreign IPOs issuing in the US and UK capital markets 
between the years 2002 and 2006. The focus is home and host country institutional effects on 
short-term performance measured as initial stock underpricing. A separate focus is also on the 
comparison of the US and UK as host countries for foreign IPOs. The findings show that 
underwriter prestige decreases underpricing, while larger board size has a positive effect on 
underpricing in both the US and UK.  Investor protection in the home country significantly 
decreased initial day underpricing of the foreign IPOs.   
 
Moore et al. (2012) present a comparative study on capital market choice with a sample of 
foreign IPOs listed in the US and UK between the years 2002 and 2006. The approach is to 
analyse how internal and external governance characteristics impact the decision of listing 
market and the institutional fit in the host market. The findings include that CEO/founder 
duality, board independence and underwriter prestige significantly influences the choice of 
capital market. It is concluded that foreign IPO firms choose a host market that best fits with 
certain firm-specific corporate governance characteristics.   
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6. Method 
The sixth section gives understanding of the research method used to empirically test the 
hypotheses. The first sections explain the data collection and data sampling process. The 
following section introduces the specific statistical techniques used, along with the regression 
equation. This is followed by a section on operationalizations, showing how the variables are 
constructed. The last three sections discuss the limitations, reliability and validity of this 
study.  
 
The research approach used in this thesis is quantitative; the study relies on numerical data to 
test the hypotheses presented in section 4.5. The interplay between theory and research is 
deductive, meaning that our hypotheses are derived, or deducted, from existing theory and 
previous empirical findings with an objective view on reality (Bryman & Bell, 2005). 
 
The statistical techniques used to empirically test the impact of internal corporate governance 
arrangements on foreign IPO underpricing are influenced partly by two studies on domestic 
IPO samples, namely Certo et al. (2001) and Filatotchev and Bishop (2002). Additionally, the 
research method is inspired by recent studies on foreign IPO samples, such as Moore et al. 
(2010) and Moore et al. (2012). All these studies were introduced in section 5.1 and 5.2. In 
line with this, the hypotheses are tested empirically using a multiple regression analysis, 
which is further detailed under section 6.2. The analysis is founded on a unique sample of 
foreign IPOs, hand-picked using a set of predetermined sample criteria in order to optimally 
serve to answer the research questions. The data is gathered in order to test the hypotheses 
empirically (Bryman & Bell, 2013). The following two sections give complete details on the 
data gathering work process, divided into data collection and data sampling.    
6.1 Data 
The data gathering process is divided into two sections. The first section shows how the data 
is collected from various sources. The second section describes the data sampling process, or 
in other words how the IPOs are narrowed down from an initial sample to a final sample, 
using a set of sample criteria. 
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6.1.1 Data collection 
The full list of IPOs by foreign firms on the LSE main market and AIM is extracted from the 
LSE website, presented in the “new issues” file (London Stock Exchange, 2014). This 
complete list is narrowed down using a set of strict sample criteria explained in the next 
section on data sampling. The initial list consists of 300 foreign IPOs. The same “new issues” 
file also contains information on total IPO proceeds and industry, used to construct two of our 
control variables introduced in section 6.3.3. The companies are also identified in Thomson 
Reuters Datastream (from now on TRD) in order to find price evolutions during the first day 
of trading for the foreign IPOs. In cases where price evolutions cannot be retrieved in TRD, 
financial information websites such as Yahoo finance, Google finance and the LSE website 
are used as a complement. Price figures are used to construct the dependent variable of the 
regression analysis, detailed in section 6.3.1. 
 
Regarding the remaining data relevant to the data analysis, the individual firms’ IPO 
prospectuses are consulted. The IPO prospectus is a standardised document, part of the listing 
procedure of the LSE, containing detailed information on firm specific corporate governance 
arrangements (see section 3.2). The IPO prospectuses are collected from the individual 
companies’ websites or via search engines such as Google. A similar study on domestic IPOs 
conducted by Certo et al. (2001) collect IPO prospectuses by written requests to the individual 
companies resulting in a response rate of 26.8 percent. Another study from 2002, conducted 
by Filatotchev and Bishop, partly rely on the same technique, but collect most of the IPO 
prospectuses from the “Global Access” database. In the absence of a relevant database for 
IPO prospectuses, and without sufficient time to send individual requests to companies, 
documents are located manually using the aforementioned work process. IPO prospectuses for 
164 of the 300 companies in the initial sample are successfully located, giving a response rate 
of roughly 55 percent
4
. Company specific information about firm-level corporate governance, 
relevant to the independent variables, is collected manually from the IPO prospectuses. 
Information on revenue from the last year before listing, as well as firm age, is likewise 
collected manually from the IPO prospectuses. For detailed information on how the variables 
are constructed, see section 6.3.  
                                                 
4
 All observations where IPO prospectuses are not found are presented in Appendix 10.2.1. 
38 
 
6.1.2 Data sampling 
The data sampling process starts with the “new issues” file, containing all IPOs on the LSE 
and AIM, supplied by the LSE on their website (London Stock Exchange, 2014). In order to 
fulfil the purpose of this thesis, a number of sample criteria are applied to this list of IPOs. 
This section aims to give understanding on the sampling process as well as explain and 
motivate the sample criteria. The first screening is done with the purpose of only including 
IPOs issued at any time within the chosen time period from 2004-01-01 to 2011-12-31. By 
using this specific time period, the study investigates a time frame that has not previously 
been covered in the area of foreign IPOs. This time period includes years before and after the 
economic recession of 2007, resulting in a sample with companies issuing an IPO in different 
economic climates. This is motivated by arguments saying that research results can vary 
substantially if focus is directed onto momentary peaks and troughs (Daily, Certo, Dalton & 
Roengpitya, 2003). The second screening is the exclusion of all IPOs issued by companies 
incorporated in the UK, since the purpose is to study foreign firms listing in the UK. 
Consistent with Moore et al. (2010), firms based in countries usually motivated solely by tax 
reasons such as the Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Bermuda and Channel Islands are excluded. 
After applying these country specific criteria the initial sample consists of 300 companies. As 
previously mentioned in section 6.1.1, 164 out of 300 IPO prospectuses are located.  
 
In line with previous studies on domestic IPOs (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002) and foreign IPOs 
(Moore et al., 2010); transactions following mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs of publicly 
listed companies, warrants, units and rights offerings are excluded. In order to differentiate 
this study from the majority of previous research on foreign equity listings and to fulfil the 
purpose of this thesis, an additional set of sample criteria are applied to the group of 164 
firms. Bruner et al. (2006), and later Moore et al. (2010) acknowledge that much previous 
research on foreign equity listings do not separate between previously listed firms and firms 
seeking to raise initial equity capital on a foreign exchange. Caglio et al. (2013) highlight the 
same problem, referring to important differences between going public on a foreign market 
and cross-listing shares on a foreign market. The discussion is introduced earlier in this thesis 
and is further highlighted by the growing number of firms seeking to go public on foreign 
exchanges. Therefore, all firms with previous trading history, as well as all firms not offering 
new equity, are excluded from the study. Consistent with the terminology in Caglio et al. 
(2013) this thesis separates global from foreign IPOs, leading to the exclusion of all firms not 
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uniquely seeking to list on the UK stock exchanges (see section 1.5). After applying all the 
sample criteria, the final sample includes 86 firms
5
. The final sample, including information 
on the date of the foreign IPO, country of origin and industry belonging is available in 
Appendix 10.1. The complete list of sample criteria is presented below.         
 
1. IPO on the LSE main international market and AIM between 2004-01-01 and 2011-
12-31. 
2. Incorporated outside the host country the UK, as well as outside the Cayman Islands, 
Bahamas, Bermuda or Channel Islands (locations used for tax reasons). 
3. Not a result of M&A or spin-off, not including offering of units, warrants or rights 
offerings. 
4. Foreign IPO by company selling unseasoned equity securities with no previous trading 
history. 
5. Not a global IPO or in other words no IPOs where securities or company shares are 
simultaneously being listed on one or several other stock exchanges.   
6.2 The regression model 
To empirically test the hypotheses outlined previously in this thesis, the variables are tested 
by constructing a multiple linear regression model, including only cross-sectional variation 
(Brooks, 2008). The regression equation is presented below, showing underpricing as a 
function of the independent variables and the control variables. The equation includes a 
constant term (α) and an error term (μ). The variables are individually presented in the 
following sections.  
 
The variables are constructed using information relevant to one event, the IPO, and do not 
reflect information that changes over time. This method is consistent with Certo et al. (2001), 
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) and Moore et al. (2010). The independent variables’ effects are 
estimated, and the individual coefficients are interpreted as partial regression coefficients 
(Brooks, 2008). This enables an investigation of all the individual variables’ respective 
explanatory power on the dependent variable, while holding the other variables constant 
(Brooks, 2008). Ordinary least squares (OLS) is utilised as estimation technique, which in 
turn requires five basic assumptions to hold in order for the model to be well specified and the 
                                                 
5
 Excluded observation because of sample criteria mismatch are presented in Appendix 10.2.2. 
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results of it unbiased (Brooks, 2008). In order to ensure that the model fulfils the five 
assumptions, several tests are run. Since the model contains an intercept and since the data 
does not vary over time, there is no need to test our model for constant error terms or 
autocorrelation. Hence, the residuals are tested for heteroscedasticity, non-stochasticity, and 
non-normality. A Breausch-Pagan test is run to check for heteroscedasticity. The model 
shows no sign of heteroscedasticity, this since the null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is 
not rejected. After running a correlation test, the residuals are concluded to be non-stochastic, 
since the regressors are all highly uncorrelated with the residuals. The model does not fulfil 
the normality assumption, since the null hypothesis of a normal distribution in the Jarque-
Bera is rejected. However, since the sample is large, the violation is left without any impact 
on the results (Brooks, 2008). 
 
Regression Model 
 
             
                                                           
                                                                
                +    
 
 
6.3 Variables and Operationalizations 
The three following sections describe how the variables in the regression model are 
constructed and how certain theoretical concepts are operationalised in this thesis.  
6.3.1 Dependent variable - underpricing 
As previously mentioned, this study aligns with Certo et al. (2001), Filatotchev and Bishop 
(2002), and Moore et al. (2010) to use underpricing as the indicator of short-term IPO 
performance. The operationalization can be visualised below and equals the percentage stock 
return on the first day of trading. It is calculated as the price at the end of the first day of 
trading minus the issue price divided by the issue price (Certo et al., 2001).  
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6.3.2 Independent variables 
Board size 
In corroboration with Darmandi and Gunawan (2012), one of the explanatory variables is 
board size. Moore et al (2010) and Bell, Moore and Filatotchev (2012) also include board size 
in their regressions as control variables. Regarding the operationalization, the size of the 
board is simply measured as the number of members included in the board of directors at the 
date of the IPO. Any mentions of future additional appointments to the board of directors 
mentioned in the prospectus, coming into effect after the date of the IPO, are not included.  
Board independence 
In accordance with Filatotchev and Bishop (2002), Bell et al. (2012), Moore (2012) and 
Darmandi and Gunawan (2012), one of the independent variables measures board 
independence. The operationalization used in this study only follows the method of the latter 
three and calculate the independence of the board as the number of board members considered 
independent divided by board size, resulting in an independence ratio. Filatotchev and Bishop 
(2002) use a dummy variable to capture if the board consists of more than 33 percent non-
executive directors. The operationalization of board independence utilised in this thesis is 
stricter than just to draw the line between executive and non-executive board members. As 
mentioned in the theory chapter (section 4.4.2), Dalton et al. (1998) are referred to for a 
detailed description of different board structure operationalizations.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the criteria for independence are in line with the criteria for an 
“outside” director. For the director to be considered an outsider in this thesis (here: 
independent), he or she must not be employed by the firm or involved in the operational 
activities. He or she must not have any professional or personal ties with the firm, 
management or other board members. Dalton et al. (1998) state a further layer to completely 
fulfil the “independency” criteria, stating that the director should have been serving on the 
board before the current CEO was appointed. This criterion is not incorporated into the 
independency criteria of this thesis, as it does not add further strength to the fulfilment of the 
specific purpose of this study.  
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Independent chairman 
Similar to Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) this study examines the effect of having an 
independent chairman heading the board of directors. Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) study the 
impact of a non-executive chairman on IPO underpricing. In contrast, this study does not 
investigate the effect of a non-executive chairman, which indicates less strict independence 
criteria. Instead, this study investigates the effect of having an independent chairman, defined 
in the exact same manner as for the board as a whole, referring to the discussion in the 
previous paragraph. The impact of an independent chairman is measured using a dichotomous 
variable, coded 1 if the chairman is considered independent and 0 otherwise.  
CEO/Founder duality 
Based on the foundation presented in the theory chapter, this study extends domestic IPO 
research by Certo et al. (2001), investigating if CEO and founder duality has any impact on 
foreign IPO performance. Moore et al (2012) build on traditional IPO research when 
investigating if CEO/founder duality helps explain choice of listing market (comparative US 
and UK). The relationship between CEO/founder duality and underpricing is operationalised 
the same way in this study, using a dummy variable, and coded 1 if the CEO and the founder 
(or co-founder) is the same person and 0 if this is not the case.  
6.3.3 Control variables 
To be consistent with previous IPO research on domestic and foreign IPO samples, and to 
control for certain characteristics that might impact the level of IPO underpricing, six control 
variables are added to the regression analysis.  
 
Firm age is controlled for by introducing a variable consisting of the time between the year of 
firm establishment and the year of the foreign IPO. This construction is consistent with 
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) and Moore et al. (2010). The rationale is based on Certo et al. 
(2001), saying that older firms have been shown to outperform younger ones (Ritter, 1998), 
potentially reflecting in after-market stock performance and/or IPO offer price.  
 
Furthermore, in order to stay consistent with much previous IPO research, revenue is used to 
control for firm size by the inclusion of a variable showing revenue from the year 
immediately preceding the IPO. As in Moore et al. (2010), revenue is included and presented 
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in million GBP. When revenue is stated in another currency than GBP in the IPO prospectus, 
an average exchange rate for the focal year is used.  
 
IPO size is also controlled for by including a variable for total IPO proceeds, further enabling 
a differentiation between big and small IPOs, suspecting that those characteristics might 
influence the level of underpricing (Daily et al., 2003).  
 
Scholars point to possible industry effects on IPO underpricing (Certo et al., 2001). Evidence 
consistently indicates excessive mispricing of high-tech IPOs, sometimes stemming from 
valuation difficulties (Certo et al., 2001). Consistent with Moore et al. (2010), a firm’s 
industry is considered as high-tech if the firm is active within any of the following: 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotech, Software or Communications. The variable is thus coded 1 if the 
firm is active within a high-tech industry and 0 if not.  
 
The effect of having an experienced CEO on the level of foreign IPO underpricing is captured 
by a control variable. Arguments are put forward saying that more experienced, or older, 
CEOs decrease uncertainty towards the underwriting investment bank (Certo et al., 2001). 
The variable is operationalised as the difference between the year of the CEO’s appointment 
and the year of the IPO.  
 
The last control variable included in the regression is UK connection, capturing the effect of 
having a connection with the host market on the board of directors. To our knowledge, no 
previous studies have included this variable. There are reasons to believe that the effect of a 
connection with the UK reduces information asymmetry between the stakeholders of the 
foreign IPO, thereby reducing the level of initial underpricing. UK connection is measured as 
a dichotomous variable coded 1 if one or more directors on the board originate from the UK, 
or have clear previous professional and/or educational experience from the UK, and 0 if no 
such connection is present on the board.   
6.4 Limitations 
Possible limitations regarding the use of secondary data are acknowledged. Secondary data is 
potentially limiting because it is gathered by external institutions and organisations as part of 
their ordinary business. This study acknowledges (1) that secondary data might cause 
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implications because of a lack of familiarity with the data, since it is not originally collected 
by the authors. The authors also (2) stay vigilant with regards to possible problems caused by 
the high complexity of the data. The quality (3) of the material can also cause misleading 
results and this study therefore solely relies on validated and well established data sources that 
are handled with criticism. Lastly (4), the authors know that because the information was 
collected by someone else, for other purposes, we therefore stay open to the risk of missing 
key variables with regards to this unique study (Bryman & Bell, 2005). 
 
The collection of the data is also a limitation. The best possible databases for this study are 
not accessible. A larger sample could possibly lead to a different results, analysis, and 
conclusions. 
 
Further limitations of this study are discussed at the end of this thesis, under further research 
in section 8.2. 
6.5 Reliability 
Reliability refers to whether or not this study could be made again, by someone else, to 
achieve the same results, and if it is subject to random or temporary errors (Bryman & Bell, 
2013).  
 
In this study, information and data relevant to the sample of foreign IPOs are gathered from 
trustworthy sources. The information on firm-level corporate governance is taken from the 
IPO prospectuses of the companies. The prices are mainly collected from TRD, which is a 
financial database commonly used in research studies. Some prices are not found in 
datastream. For these situations, financial websites such as London Stock Exchange, Yahoo 
Finance and Google Finance are used. Regarding the analysis of the data, Eviews 8 is used in 
order to retrieve the estimators of the variables included in the regression, and there is no need 
to disbelieve the presented output. 
 
One aspect of the work process is identified as a possible threat to the overall reliability of this 
study. All the information and data from the IPO prospectuses, as well as from TRD, are 
manually transferred into excel sheets in order to run the regression model. However, the 
transfer from the original sources is made under great caution and is manually checked for 
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errors several times. The risk for error is therefore limited, strengthening the reliability of the 
study. 
6.6 Validity 
Bryman and Bell (2013) categorise the concept of validity under four main sections: 
measurement validity, internal validity, external validity and ecological validity. The three 
first are applied to this study and discussed further below. The latter (ecological validity) is 
left aside, since it relates more to qualitative research methods including surveys and 
questionnaires.   
 
This study avoids measurement validity related problems by utilising common, empirically 
tested and well-known operationalizations of the theoretical concepts. The 
operationalizations, and the studies they are based on, can be found under the individual 
variable descriptions earlier in this section 6.3. Regarding the dependent variable, it has been 
argued whether one day is sufficient to capture all price corrections or not. Ljungqvist (2007), 
however, state that for all developed capital markets, where no restrictions on daily price 
increases or day-to-day trading exist, one day is normally enough to witness the full effect of 
the initial stock mispricing.   
 
Regarding the internal validity, concerns are raised whether all the variation in the dependent 
variable is exclusively explained by the included independent and control variables. The 
possibilities of other variables, not included in this study, having explanatory power on the 
underpricing of the IPOs in the sample must be acknowledged. However, the purpose of this 
study is not to explain all the variation of underpricing. Many previous studies have 
documented other variables having significant explanatory power on IPO underpricing. 
Venture capitalist involvement, underwriter reputation and firm-level risk factors, for 
example, are common approaches when examining the extent of IPO underpricing (Certo et 
al., 2001). 
 
As mentioned in section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, some difficulties in the data collection process and 
the availability of certain information lead to the exclusion of several original observations. 
Circumstances out of the authors’ control could possibly affect the external validity of this 
study. Concerns are specifically raised on the possibilities of some firm types being over 
46 
 
represented in the final sample. Skewed information availability over the sample, and a 
possible over-representation of “more successful” firms, stemming from the fact that 
information is more difficult to find for either acquired or dead firms, potentially leads to less 
generalizable results. 
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7.  Empirical findings 
This section gives a description of the final sample. This is followed by an analysis based on 
descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. The overall results of the regression 
analysis are presented and discussed. The discussion is then turned to the individual 
hypotheses, which are analysed based on the results of the regression model and in relation to 
previous theory and empirical findings. 
7.1 Description of sample 
The final sample of 86 foreign IPOs is presented in Appendix 10.1, containing information 
extracted from the “new issues” file distributed by the LSE (London Stock Exchange, 2014). 
In order to give an understanding of the foreign IPOs, this section starts by presenting the 
characteristics of the firms included in the final sample. 
 
Figure 3. Sample distribution among the foreign IPOs, sorted after country of origin. 
 
 
The firms in the sample originate from 19 different countries around the world. As shown in 
figure 3 above, the most frequent country of origin in the sample is the US with 27 firms, 
followed by the Netherlands and Israel with seven firms each. The firms in the final sample 
operate within 31 different industries, making it difficult to deduce any real patterns with 
regards to industry belongings.  
 
Figure 4 displays the sample distribution of the foreign IPOs by issuing year. The number of 
IPOs conducted each year varies from one to 29. The highest concentration of foreign IPOs is 
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in year 2006, with roughly 34 percent of the total population. Similar to the pattern shown in 
figure 1, section 1, there is a peak among the final sample firms in 2006, before the financial 
crisis. A strong down cycle can be seen with the financial crisis, seemingly coming into full 
effect in year 2008. 
 
Figure 4. Number of foreign IPOs in the final sample, sorted after year of issuance. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
A deeper analysis of the issuing firms in the sample is presented in relation to the variables 
included in the regression model. The analysis is founded on descriptive statistics, generated 
as a part of the regression output in Eviews 8. Descriptive statistics for the variables are 
presented in figure 5; displaying statistics relevant to the in-text discussion (see Appendix 
10.3 for the complete output). The analysis logically starts with a discussion in relation to the 
dependent variable, foreign IPO underpricing.   
 
As presented below, in figure 5, the average first day upswing in stock price is found to be 
7.27 percent. This is equivalent of saying that the firms in the sample, on average, are 
underpriced by 7.27 percent. Moreover, 79 percent of the firms in the sample are underpriced, 
or 68 out of 86 companies. 79 percent of the sample firms thus experience a positive first day 
return after the foreign IPO. Seven firms remain at the same price after the first day of trading 
and the remaining eleven firms experience a negative first day return. The span of foreign IPO 
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underpricing in the sample ranges between a 37 percent stock price decline after one day of 
trading to a positive return of 42 percent for the most underpriced IPO in the sample. 
Although problematic because of different time periods, different samples and the previous 
discussion on IPO cyclicalities, the average underpricing can cautiously be compared to much 
higher figures found in some of the previous studies on foreign IPOs that are highlighted in 
section 5. Moore et al. (2010), for example, find 50 percent underpricing for foreign IPOs in 
the UK and US. Moreover, 7.27 percent stands out as a relatively low figure when compared 
to previous research findings within traditional IPO research, shown in figure 2 (section 
4.1.1)
6
.  
 
Regardless of previous studies, the underpricing of 7.27 percent found in this study represents 
a large amount of unretained wealth for the initial shareholders, or “money left on the table”. 
The total monetary value of the underpricing for the sample represents almost 200 million 
GBP.  
 
Figure 5. Descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression analysis. 
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
Underpricing 0.07269 0.04508 0.41666 -0.374 
     Independent variables 
    Board size 6.3 6 12 3 
Board independence  0.568 0.571 1 0.222 
Independent chairman 0.674 1 1 0 
CEO founder duality 0.349 0 1 0 
     Control variables 
    CEO experience 5.13 4 23 0 
UK connection 0.826 1 1 0 
Firm age 11.92 8 121 0 
Firm size (£m) 125.3 3.6 6943.2 0 
High-tech 0.326 0 1 0 
IPO proceeds (£m) 31.85 12.29 304.43 0.5 
 
 
In order to continue the analysis, focus is shifted onto the four independent variables used in 
the regression model. In terms of board size, the average board size for the foreign firms in 
                                                 
6
 Certo et al. (2001) find 17 percent IPO underpricing among domestic IPOs in the US. Filatotchev and Bishop 
(2002) find 29.7 percent for a sample of domestic UK IPOs.  
50 
 
the sample is 6.3 members. Regarding the board independence ratio, the boards on average 
consist of 57 percent independent board members, or members of the board considered 
independent from the criteria of independence used in this study. When the independence 
focus is shifted to the chairman, the descriptive statistics show that 67 percent of the 
companies in the sample have a chairman that meets the independency criteria used in this 
study. Among the sample firms, almost 35 percent of the firms have the founder of the 
company in the position of CEO, and are thereby identified as having a CEO/founder 
duality.   
 
In terms of the control variables included in the regression model, descriptive statistics give 
useful insights to the sample. The average experience of the CEOs in the sample is just over 
five years. 83 percent of the companies included in the sample are identified as having one or 
several board members with a direct connection to the United Kingdom. The mean firm age 
of the sample is just under 12 years and the average revenue of the companies is about 125 
million GBP. The average IPO proceeds are 31.8 million GBP and 33 percent of the 
companies in the sample are operating in a high-tech industry, using the criteria previously 
mentioned in section 6.3.3. 
7.2.1 Correlations 
Appendix 10.4 shows a correlation table over all the variables in the model. No warning flags 
are raised over any variables being too highly correlated, and that would indicate that 
multicollinearity will not be a danger to this study. The rule of thumb and cut off point of 0.8 
is used to investigate the presence of any multicollinear variables (Brooks, 2008). None of the 
variables are correlated above the cut-off point. The only two variables correlated above 0.7 
are firm size and firm age, indicating a known, not particularly surprising, relationship saying 
that older firms in general have had time to generate higher revenues. One interesting feature 
is that, contradictory to Certo et al. (2001), the high-tech dummy variable is not especially 
correlated with the dependent variable.   
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7.3 Regression analysis 
Attention is now turned to presenting and discussing the results of the regression analysis. 
The section begins with a presentation of the overall regression results. This is followed by a 
deeper analysis, divided among the four hypotheses that are deduced from theory and tested 
empirically in this thesis.  
 
The results of the regression model are displayed in figure 6 below. For the original 
regression output, see Appendix 10.5. The results of two regressions are presented. The first 
results are the main regression results and the second shows results of a second model, run as 
a robustness test (see section 7.3.1). The model is performed with HAC (heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent) standard errors in order to ensure that these conditions are 
corrected for, even though the likelihood of the occurrence is small since the model was 
checked for both conditions as mentioned in section 6.2. 
 
As presented in figure 6, the R-squared, a measure of how much of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the right-hand side variables included in the model 
(Brooks, 2008), is modest at just above ten percent. The low R-squared is in parity with a 
similar study by Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) and is indicative of other factors, not 
represented in the model, having explanatory power on foreign IPO underpricing, something 
that is discussed as internal validity in section 6.6. The high p-value of the f-test indicates that 
a joint significance test of all the variable coefficients in the model fails to reject the null 
hypothesis saying that they have a determined collective explanatory power (Brooks, 2008). 
The intercept of the regression is significant, statistically proving that the firms in our sample 
are underpriced. The p-values displayed in the regression output are two-tailed probabilities. 
This has implications for the interpretation of the one-sided hypotheses produced in this 
thesis. It means that the probability in one tail of the distribution will be half the value that is 
presented in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Results from the regression analysis 
  Main results Robustness model 
  Beta P-value Beta P-value 
Constant 0.111303 0.0298** 0.135111 0.0144** 
     
Independent variables 
    
Board size 0.000501 0.9352 0.002653 0.6719 
Board independence  -0.013431 0.8823 -0.113809 0.3157 
Independent chairman -0.053254 0.0802* -0.072716 0.0380** 
CEO founder duality -0.027961 0.3033 -0.027577 0.3561 
     
Control variables 
    
CEO experience 0.003129 0.3072 0.007466 0.0645* 
UK connection 0.032776 0.2262 0.050040 0.0879* 
Firm age -0.002346 0.0436** -0.003561 0.0147** 
Firm size 3.36E-05 0.0714* 5.52E-05 0.0231** 
High-tech 0.009657 0.7729 0.046701 0.2913 
IPO proceeds -0.000345 0.0961* -0.000260 0.2536 
     
R² 0.100143 
 
0.186906 
 
∆R² 
  
0,086763 
 
Equation F-value 0.834656 0.596934 1.333242 0.235031 
* = P-value < 0.1 (two-tailed), ** = P-value < 0.5 (two-tailed), *** = < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
7.3.1 Robustness test 
In order to ensure that the relationships generated by the main regression analysis are robust 
and not the result of spurious relationships, a robustness check similar to the one used in 
Certo et al. (2001) is run. The results presented to the right of our main regression results are 
generated after 20 percent of the sample is deleted on a random basis. All variables, except for 
“CEO founder duality” and “IPO proceeds”, are associated with higher significance levels in 
the model where 20 percent of the firms are excluded. All previously significant variables are 
strengthened in the second model and R squared is improved, indicating that the results are 
likely to reflect definite structures in the data set (Certo et al., 2001). 
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7.4 Analysis of hypotheses 
7.4.1 Board size and foreign IPO underpricing 
H1: A larger board size is positively associated with foreign IPO underpricing 
The analysis now continues to investigate the first hypothesis produced in this thesis. This 
study anticipates a positive relationship between the size of the board and IPO underpricing, 
indicating that a larger board on average is associated with higher IPO underpricing.  
 
From the regression results presented in figure 6, the generated relationship between board 
size and underpricing is visualised. The relationship is barely positive and the coefficient is 
highly insignificant. Any statistical causality can therefore not be deduced from the regression 
output. Above that, the observations for board size and underpricing are plotted in a scatter 
graph, visualised including a fitted regression line showing the estimated relationship in 
figure 7. As visualised in the figure, no clear pattern among the plotted observations for the 
variables board size and foreign IPO underpricing can be found, rendering an almost 
horizontal regression line. Without the possibility of statistically determining a relationship 
between board size and underpricing, it instead seems as the size of the board has no 
determining power on underpricing in a foreign IPO context. In other words, the null 
hypothesis of a non-existent relationship cannot be rejected in this case.  
 
Figure 7. The observation distribution for foreign IPO underpricing and the board size variable 
(number of board members). 
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However, the indication of a positive relationship between board size and underpricing is 
consistent with Moore et al. (2010), even though Moore et al. (2010) statistically prove the 
relationship between the variables. Darmandi and Gunawan (2012) find underpricing to 
decrease with board size in a sample of Indonesian domestic IPOs. Darmandi and Gunawan’s 
results are in line with Filatotchev and Bishop’s (2002), although reversed, as they find that 
board size increases the probability of a successful IPO with high significance.  
 
For the final sample, the average board size of just above six members is well below the ten 
members that Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest decreases the effectiveness of the board. 
With six members being well beneath ten, evidence of smaller boards being more effective, 
could provide guidance as to why board size do not impact on foreign IPO underpricing 
(Yermack & Shivdasani 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). The inconclusiveness of the results for 
hypothesis 1, showing no clear relationship in either direction, indicates that board size, at 
least for this specific sample, does not impact on foreign IPO underpricing. In other words, no 
signaling effects of board size are found.    
7.4.2 Board independence and foreign IPO underpricing 
H2: Higher proportions of independent board members are negatively associated with 
foreign IPO underpricing  
The second hypothesis anticipates that a higher share of independent board members reduces 
foreign IPO underpricing. Figure 6 shows that the relationship between board independence 
and underpricing is slightly negative. However, the relationship between the variables cannot 
be statistically proven, since it is associated with a very high p-value, leaving the results 
inconclusive. The high p-value rules out any possibilities of inferring conclusive casualties, 
and leads to a situation where the null hypothesis of a non-existent relationship cannot be 
rejected. The seemingly random relationship between the variables is displayed below in 
figure 8, showing the observations for the variables board independence and underpricing 
plotted against one another. An ocular investigation suggests inconclusiveness, indicated also 
by the estimated regression line plotted in the diagram travelling almost horizontally with a 
slight negative incline. The results generate indication of a non-existent relationship between 
having higher board independence and underpricing in a foreign IPO context.  
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Figure 8. The observation distribution for foreign IPO underpricing and the variable for board 
independence (ratio of independent to non-independent directors). 
 
 
The results of this study differentiate from the results of Darmandi and Gunawan (2012) who 
significantly conclude that the underpricing of domestic Indonesian IPOs increases with board 
independence. A positive relationship as such runs counter to well-rooted theories behind 
board independency suggesting that outside, or independent, directors are more prone to align 
with the interests of shareholders, and to be less biased towards management (Dalton et al., 
1998). On the contrary, the insignificant negative relationship that is indicated by the results 
in this thesis is consistent, although in a reversed manner, with Certo et al. (2001) where a 
positive (but insignificant) relationship between insiders on the board and domestic IPO 
underpricing is found. The indication of a negative relationship is also in line with findings 
presented by Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) showing a negative impact on underpricing from 
having more than one third non-executive directors on the board.  
 
The statistical insignificance of the relationship between board independence and foreign IPO 
underpricing prevents any conclusions to be drawn. Hypothesis 2 is therefore rejected and the 
results show that for this sample of foreign IPOs including a higher share of independent 
board members does not impact the level of IPO underpricing.    
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7.4.3 Independent chairman and foreign IPO underpricing 
H3: Having an independent chairman is negatively associated with foreign IPO underpricing 
As stated previously in this thesis, hypothesis 3 anticipates a negative relationship between 
having an independent chairman at the head of the board of directors and foreign IPO 
underpricing. The regression output shown in figure 6 statistically confirms a negative 
relationship, showing a p-value under the 10 percent level (p-value of 0.08). The relationship 
is thus significant below the 5 percent level, remembering that the results in the regression 
output display two-sided probabilities. The coefficient indicates that firms with an 
independent chairman are on average 5.3 percent less underpriced than firms with a non-
independent chairman. The observations for the dichotomous variable in relation to 
underpricing are plotted in a scatter diagram, visualised below in figure 9. The diagram shows 
a clearly negatively inclining fitted regression line. The results from the overall regression 
indicate that firms with an independent chairman on average leave roughly 1.7 million GBP 
less on the table when going public (5.3 percent of average proceeds in the sample which was 
31.8 million GBP), relative to the firms with a non-independent chairman.  
 
Figure 9. The observation distribution for foreign IPO underpricing and the dummy variable for 
independent chairman. 
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(2002) find a negative, but insignificant, relationship between having a non-executive 
chairman and underpricing. The negative direction is thus consistent with the results 
presented in this thesis. An independent chairman aligning with the interests of the initial 
shareholders of the firm should be concerned with underpricing as a failure of original 
shareholder wealth retention (Certo et al., 2001). In that case, the effectiveness of assigning an 
independent chairman can be supported, showing a statistically significant negative 
relationship. This is in corroboration with Hart (1995) that states the purpose of the UK 
corporate governance code and shows that an independent chairman better fulfils his or her 
purpose of taking effective decisions on behalf of the existing shareholders. The results can 
give empirical weight to arguments that an independent chairman better aligns with the 
interests of shareholders (Coles & Hertsley, 2000), thereby naturally seeking to reduce IPO 
underpricing. Furthermore, IPO firms are in special need of the external links and expertise 
potentially offered by an independent director (Certo et al., 2001). To foreign IPO firms, who 
arguably are in special need of professional guidance when entering into a new market and 
regulative environment, having an independent chairman can prove to be of increased 
importance. The negative relationship found in this thesis can provide justification to the 
importance of resource dependence views in a foreign IPO context (Dalton et al., 1998), when 
outside or independent directors’ contributions can help bridge information asymmetry 
problems towards the investment bank and the host market investors. There is therefore 
support for possible signaling properties of an independent chairman. This suggests that 
adverse selection costs from information asymmetry problems paid by the initial shareholders, 
veiled as IPO underpricing, can be reduced by the assignment of an independent chairman.  
7.4.4 CEO/founder duality and foreign IPO underpricing  
H4: CEO/founder duality is positively associated with foreign IPO underpricing  
In terms of the fourth and final hypothesis, the relationship between CEO/founder duality and 
IPO underpricing is investigated. As evident from figure 6, the relationship is negative but 
without being statistically significant. The coefficient gives indication of a negative 
relationship, but the p-value above 10 percent renders the results statistically inconclusive and 
relationships will have to be inferred with caution. Figure 6 shows two-sided probabilities, 
meaning that the p-value for a one-sided interpretation approaches the 10 percent level. The 
negative relationship moves opposite to what is suggested by hypothesis 4. When interpreting 
the value of the coefficient, it indicates that the underpricing is, on average, 2.8 percent lower 
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when duality exists in the firm. An interpretation of this is that founder-led firms in our 
sample leave on average less “money on the table” and are more successful in retaining initial 
shareholder wealth compared with firms not managed by the founder. The observations for 
the two variables CEO/founder duality and underpricing are plotted in figure 10, showing an 
estimated regression line. The relationship is slightly negative, consistent with the overall 
regression results. 
 
Figure 10. The observation distribution for foreign IPO underpricing and the dummy variable for 
CEO/founder duality. 
 
 
The findings for CEO/founder duality among foreign IPOs are not consistent with the results 
of Certo et al. (2001), who find a positive relationship between the duality and underpricing 
for domestic IPOs in the US. The negative relationship found in this thesis might however 
strengthen arguments discussed in section 4.4.4, saying that the CEO/founder duality is better 
received within the UK corporate governance regulatory system, as opposed to the US 
(Moore et al., 2012). The institutional environment in the UK, partly introduced in section 3, 
is arguably more appreciative of personal qualities and individual skills than of adequate 
professional expertise (Moore et al., 2012). The strict enforcements of SOA in the US, 
requiring adherence to complex regulations for a foreign firm at the time of the foreign IPO, 
and afterwards, renders justification to the results of Certo et al. (2001), where firms led by 
non-founder CEOs are less underpriced. Compelling evidence has been presented on the 
tendencies of founders of IPO firms in the UK to remain as CEO or chairman, suggesting 
common acceptance of the practise (Filatotchev, Wright & Arberk, 2006). CEO/founder 
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duality might be related with higher uncertainty in a US IPO context, compared to the UK. If 
underwriters are less concerned about a founder in the role of CEO, then underpricing 
because of risk-averse tendencies should play a less important role (Tinic, 1988). If a negative 
association would have been determined statistically, it would have confirmed the previous 
discussion on founder and entrepreneur acceptance in a UK context, suggesting that 
underwriters in the UK are more prone to value founder led IPO firms closer to the real value. 
A general acceptance would however also incorporate outside investors, happily investing in 
founder led IPOs, logically pushing the stock price up during the first day of trading (Certo et 
al., 2001). The effect of this might however be cancelled out by founder positive underwriting 
investment banks pricing the IPO correctly, leaving less room for first day investors to adjust 
the share price upwards. The insignificant negative direction of the relationship, combined 
with the previous discussion on special features of the UK corporate governance environment, 
spurs interesting possibilities for further research. A discussion will hence follow in section 
8.2.   
 
Lastly, remembering the statistical insignificance, the negative effect of having a founder as 
CEO on IPO underpricing suggests consistency with theories arguing that the founder holds 
special incentives, enabling effective decision-making (Jayaraman et al., 2000).  
7.5 Control variable analysis 
The analysis now turns to the control variables included in the regression model. No 
hypotheses are formed around these variables. An analysis of the results of the control 
variables is of interest and completes a comprehensive picture of the regression results. The 
results for the control variables are interpreted individually below.  
 
The relationship between the experience of the CEO and underpricing is slightly positive, 
suggesting that having a CEO with more experience in the firm is associated with more severe 
underpricing. This can be interpreted as rather counter intuitive, and opposite to findings by 
Certo et al (2001), showing a negative relationship between the CEOs experience (measured 
as age of the CEO) and underpricing. The positive relationship found here is not significant in 
the main regression model. In the robustness model, however, the relationship is significant 
on the 10 percent level.  
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Regarding connection to the host market (“UK connection”), this control variable shows a 
positive association with higher IPO underpricing. The variable is insignificant in the main 
regression model, making potential inferences misleading. The positive relationship is, 
however, statistically significant in the robustness model.  
  
Firm age and firm size are significant on the 5 and 10 percent level respectively. These results 
are consistent with Certo et al. (2001), also showing that the relationship between firm age 
and underpricing is negative whilst the relationship between firm size and underpricing is 
slightly positive.  
 
Concerning the high-tech industry dummy variable, the association with foreign IPO 
underpricing is positive. The direction is consistent with rationale behind the control variable, 
and with findings of Certo et al. (2001). The results do however differ from Moore et al 
(2010), as they find a negative relationship between coming from a high-tech industry and the 
level of foreign IPO underpricing. Despite the indicated direction of the relationship, the high-
tech variable is insignificant and the results regarding the variable are therefore inconclusive.  
 
The regression output shows that higher IPO proceeds are associated with lower levels of 
foreign IPO underpricing, confirming the notion that larger offerings are perceived as less 
risky, and therefore render lower uncertainty and subsequently lower levels of underpricing 
(Daily et al., 2003).   
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8.    Conclusion  
This conclusive section is divided into a discussion part and a further research part. The first 
part is a concluding discussion, summarising the empirical findings of this thesis and 
discussing the implications. This section is based on the authors’ own perspectives.  
8.1 Concluding discussion  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effect of internal corporate governance 
arrangements on the underpricing of foreign IPOs. Four characteristics are investigated: board 
size, board independence, chairman independence and CEO/founder duality. This study 
emphasises the need to make distinctions within foreign equity listing research, challenging 
consensus-like arguments that foreign IPOs are best studied as a part of cross-listing 
literature, or even just within traditional domestic IPO research. Our standpoint leads to the 
emergence of foreign IPOs as a separate research field, pointing out deciding differences 
compared to cross-listings and domestic IPOs. We highlight a gap of corporate governance 
studies directed at the “soft” law legal environment that characterises UK capital markets. We 
set out to initiate a field of research identifying effective firm-level corporate governance 
arrangements and empirically test them for significance as means of bridging high 
information asymmetries when crossing borders at the time of an IPO. 
 
Our findings provide contributions to IPO signaling literature by investigating the signaling 
properties of four firm-level corporate governance characteristics. This thesis provides an 
empirical analysis of board characteristics in the context of foreign IPOs. We highlight 
important firm implications of underpricing, showing that high returns during the first day of 
trading can be seen as a transfer of wealth from the firm to first-day investors (Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002). In relation to this, we show that the amount of wealth transferred to first-day 
investors, or left unretained by pre-issue owners, can be directly associated with the status of 
the chairman of the foreign IPO firm. A firm with an independent chairman is shown to be 
associated with significantly higher wealth-retention at the time of a foreign IPO. This sheds 
light on potentially important signaling properties of an independent chairman. Furthermore, 
our results indicate that independently chaired boards align more effectively with shareholder 
interests, considering that pre-issue owners should be concerned with large amounts of money 
left on the table (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). This suggests an effective mitigation of the 
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adverse selection costs that IPO underpricing means to original shareholders. High 
information asymmetries towards underwriters and outside investors in foreign IPOs are 
bridged by the inclusion of a chairman with independently developed interests.    
 
The fact that we do not find any statistical association between board size and foreign IPO 
underpricing, along with the inconclusive findings for board independence and foreign IPO 
underpricing, possibly suggests that foreign IPO specific theory is needed to exactly capture 
present conflicts. Reasons for this could possibly be found by looking at the properties of the 
IPO as an event. Some scholars have touched on it, arguing that classical agency conflicts 
take on other forms when applied to IPOs (see Certo et al., 2001). A higher proportion of 
independent board members is usually motivated by the reduction of agency costs of free cash 
flow appearing if managers are not controlled. This argument could lose strength for IPOs, 
since as we have shown, foreign IPOs appear from the need to raise cash and fund growth 
opportunities. The results add knowledge by indicating irrelevance of well-established 
theoretical perspectives in the context of foreign IPOs.    
 
Looking at the association between CEO/founder duality and foreign IPO underpricing, the 
relationship cannot be statistically determined. Interestingly, the positive relationship moves 
opposite to what we anticipated, as well as the opposite direction to results found in previous 
studies in an US context (see Certo et al., 2001). The results indicate that founder-led firms 
are relatively well received by investors, as well as underwriters, within the UK corporate 
governance system. This is in line with evidence and theory presented by Moore et al. (2012). 
The indications of a positive relationship shed light on possibly important research extensions 
of this thesis.    
 
Apart from important theoretical contributions, this thesis offers important practical 
recommendations. For instance, the results are potentially useful to firm representatives of 
threshold firms that are transforming into publicly owned on a foreign exchange. Usefulness 
is arguably accentuated for transformations taking place within the comply-or-explain system 
that characterises UK corporate governance regulations. There exists substantial wiggle room 
for public firms to be creative in the board room. Some scholars argue that some aspects of 
corporate governance should not be left up to market participants (Bebchuck, 2002). In the 
light of this, practical guidance may be of even further importance. The self-regulatory and 
normative emphasis in the UK (Moore et al., 2012) enables for more elaborate strategic 
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decision-making when it comes to corporate governance arrangements. Our results offer 
direct indications of causalities, or non-causalities for that matter, that can be useful to 
practitioners who are up against multifaceted equity listing decisions.   
8.2 Further research 
During the course of completing this thesis, several areas for possible extensions of our study 
as well as important fields for further research have come to the authors’ attention.   
 
Future research should focus on further developing signaling theory applications on foreign 
IPO performance. Market participants are prone to benefit from a comprehensive framework 
of effective corporate governance related signals. This thesis tests corporate governance 
related signals linked with board structure and firm management.  
 
This study touches on important information asymmetries and agency costs in a foreign IPO 
context. Further research should aim to classify exactly what conflicts impact IPO 
underpricing. It is argued that popular agency theory explanations for overinvestment 
problems and free cash flow problems are not applicable to studies on IPOs, where money is 
raised often for the sole purpose of satisfying high investment needs (Certo et al., 2001). In 
order to develop effective IPO specific signals, a framework for what conflicts are most 
salient in foreign IPOs is needed.  
 
Being one of the first studies of firm-level corporate governance effects on foreign IPO 
performance, this study has several limitations that could ignite future research fields. First, 
our study does not aim to explain any higher share of foreign IPO underpricing variations. 
The R-squared of our regression model is modest, suggesting a weak collective explanatory 
power of the independent variables. This calls for more extensive studies where a bigger part 
of foreign IPO underpricing is explained. Second, this study is focused on short-term 
performance, and the implications of initial IPO underpricing. Some motives for longitudinal 
studies do arise, like in Bell et al. (2012), where firm-level corporate governance effects on 
measures of post-IPO performance are included. It could be of importance to study variations 
of corporate governance arrangements over time, along with the effects on long-term post-
IPO performance. Third, the focus of this study is exclusively the UK capital markets. One 
could imagine the importance of giving attention to other capital markets as hosts of foreign 
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IPOs. While the UK capital markets are suitable for this type of study, we do see large 
movements of foreign IPOs even in Asia. The Singapore and Hong Kong stock exchanges 
hosts large quantities of foreign IPOs and shows important features of becoming official hubs 
for mostly Asian firms seeking benefits of internationalising the cost of capital (PWC, 2012). 
Furthermore, this study disregards delistings and withdrawals from trading. Further research 
should dig deeper into explaining delisting tendencies, investigating factors that lead to 
unsuccessful foreign listings.    
 
The indicative positive relationship between CEO/founder duality and foreign IPO 
underpricing found in this thesis highlights potentially important comparative extensions. The 
positive association in relation to findings in the US (Certo et al., 2001) pinpoints important 
diverging tendencies within two common law legal systems (the US and UK). Moore et al. 
(2012) claim that CEO/founder duality is priced higher in the UK than in the US. An 
extension of Moore et al. (2012), and of this study, could possibly focus on how corporate 
governance arrangements are received differently in the UK, compared to the US. To our 
knowledge, except for Jonathan (2013), few scholars have dug deep into the Sarbanes-Oxley 
act’s direct impact on how firm-level corporate governance arrangements impact firm 
performance differently within common law legal traditions. 
 
As previously mentioned, having an independent chairman is negatively associated with 
foreign IPO underpricing. To our knowledge, the effect of an independent chairman on IPO 
performance is unexplored and calls for even further exploration. For example, it could be of 
interest to investigate effects on domestic UK IPOs, as well as both domestic and foreign 
IPOs in the US. Due to the regulatory acceptance of CEO/chairman duality in the US, the 
difference between independent and non-independent chairman interests could potentially be 
greater. The incentives of a CEO in the position as the chairman could cause even more 
severe agency conflicts between management and shareholders, making it an interesting topic 
for further research.   
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10. Appendix 
10.1 The final Sample  
A list of all 86 foreign IPOs included in the final sample, sorted after date of IPO. Further 
information includes country of origin and industry belonging.  
SOLAR INTEGRATED TECH0LOGIES INC   5/12/2004 USA Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
NOORWOOD IMMU0LOGY                  6/30/2004 Australia Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
FRONTIER MINING                     9/2/2004 USA Mining 
BDI MINING CORP                     9/30/2004 Canada Mining 
FALKLAND OIL & GAS                  10/14/2004 Falkland Islands Oil & Gas 
GAMING VC HLDGS S,A,                12/21/2004 Luxemburg Leisure & Hotels 
121MEDIA INC                        12/23/2004 USA Media & Entertainment 
FRONTERA RESOURCES CORP             3/14/2005 USA Oil & Gas 
GLADSTONE PACIFIC NICKEL            3/17/2005 Australia Mining 
LEADCOM INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS        4/7/2005 Israel Information Technology Hardware 
METAL-TECH                          5/13/2005 Israel Chemicals 
POLYFUEL INC                        7/5/2005 USA Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
URALS ENERGY PUBLIC CO              8/9/2005 Cyprus Oil & Gas 
F,T,S,-FORMULA TELECOM SOLUTIONS    8/18/2005 Israel Software & Computer Services 
KARELIAN DIAMOND RESOURCES          9/1/2005 Republic of Ireland Mining 
SQS SOFTWARE QUALITY SYSTEMS AG     9/20/2005 Germany Software & Computer Services 
GLOBAL BRANDS SA                    9/29/2005 Luxemburg Leisure & Hotels 
INTERNATIONAL FERRO METALS          9/30/2005 USA Steel & Other Metals 
ACTA SPA                            10/4/2005 Italy Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
SEEING MACHINES                     12/1/2005 Australia Information Technology Hardware 
AMIAD FILTRATION SYSTEMS            12/5/2005 Israel Engineering & Machinery 
ORPAK SYSTEMS                       12/8/2005 Israel Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
UNIVISION ENGINEERING               12/16/2005 Hong Kong Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
XCOUNTER AB                         2/1/2006 Sweden Health Care Equipment & Services 
GOLD FROST                          3/9/2006 Israel Food Producers 
PLANET GROUP INC                    3/20/2006 USA General Financial 
AQUA BOUNTY TECH0LOGIES INC        3/20/2006 USA Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
SANDVINE CORP                       3/21/2006 Canada Technology Hardware & Equipment 
FINDERS RESOURCES                   3/22/2006 Australia Mining 
GOLDENPORT HLDGS INC                4/5/2006 Greece Shipping 
ENTELOS INC                         4/12/2006 USA Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
CAP-XX                              4/20/2006 Australia Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
BURST MEDIA CORP                    4/21/2006 USA Media 
BATEMAN LITWIN N,V,                 5/23/2006 Netherlands 
Oil Equipment, Services & 
Distribution 
POWERFILM INC                       5/31/2006 USA Constriction & Materials 
OCZ TECH0LOGY GROUP INC            6/21/2006 USA Technology Hardware & Equipment 
PROTONEX TECH0LOGY CORP            7/3/2006 USA Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
COLT TELECOM GROUP S,A,             7/3/2006 Luxemburg Fixed Line Telecommunications 
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TINCI HOLDINGS                      7/31/2006 Hong Kong Industrial Engineering 
JUMPTV INC                          8/10/2006 Canada Media 
PLATMIN LIMITED                     8/10/2006 Canada Mining 
SPAZIO INVESTMENT NV                10/18/2006 Netherlands Real Estate 
DATATEC                             10/20/2006 South Africa Software & Computer Services 
LED INTL HLDGS LTD                  10/23/2006 Hong Kong Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
ZAMA0 PLC                          10/31/2006 Republic of Ireland Mobile Telecommunication 
SOMERO ENTERPRISES INC              11/1/2006 USA Industrial Engineering 
SIMIGON LTD                         11/2/2006 Israel Software & Computer Services 
CATALYTIC SOLUTIONS INC             11/22/2006 USA Automobiles & Parts 
HELESI PLC                          11/23/2006 Cyprus Support Services 
POLYMER LOGISTICS NV                12/13/2006 Netherlands General Industrials 
MIRLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP PLC        12/18/2006 Cyprus Real Estate 
PETMIN LTD                          12/20/2006 South Africa Mining 
APPLIED INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL        1/26/2007 USA Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
REDKNEE SOLUTIONS INC               2/23/2007 Canada Software & Computer Services 
VYCON INC                           3/9/2007 USA Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
DRAGONWAVE INC                      4/19/2007 Canada Technology Hardware & Equipment 
POWERFLUTE OYJ                      5/11/2007 Finland Forestry & Paper 
VECTRIX CORP                        5/24/2007 USA Automobiles & Parts 
TYRATECH INC                        6/1/2007 USA Chemicals 
TALVIVAARA MINING CO LTD            6/1/2007 Finland Industrial Metals 
BURANI DESIGNER HLDG NV             6/20/2007 Netherlands General Retailers 
AOI MEDICAL INC                     6/22/2007 USA Health Care Equipment & Services 
MAPLE ENERGY PLC                    7/13/2007 Republic of Ireland Oil & Gas Producers 
CONNEMARA MINING PLC                7/31/2007 Republic of Ireland Mining 
AISI REALTY PUBLIC LTD              8/1/2007 Cyprus Real Estate 
CRYO-SAVE GROUP NV                  11/6/2007 Netherlands Health Care Equipment & Services 
MEDGENICS INC                       12/4/2007 USA Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
NEW BRITAIN PALM OIL LTD            12/17/2007 Papua New Guinea Food Producers 
KDD GROUP NV                        12/19/2007 Netherlands Equity Investment Instruments 
NATSUN HLDGS LTD                    12/24/2007 Hong Kong Personal Goods 
ARMOR DESIGNS INC                   12/31/2007 USA Software & Computer Services 
LIFELINE SCIENTIFIC INC             1/7/2008 USA Health Care Equipment & Services 
TGE MARINE AG                       5/15/2008 Germany Industrial Engineering 
MORTICE LTD                         5/15/2008 Singapore Support Services 
RESACA EXPLOITATION INC             7/17/2008 USA Oil & Gas Producers 
ASIAN PLANTATIONS LTD               11/30/2009 Singapore Food Producers 
ARGOS RESOURCES LTD                 7/29/2010 Falkland Islands Oil & Gas Producers 
HALOSOURCE INC                      10/18/2010 USA Chemicals 
PHOTON KATHAAS PRODUCTIONS LTD      11/4/2010 Singapore Media 
JUBILANT ENERGY N,V,                11/24/2010 Netherlands Oil & Gas Producers 
PROPHOTONIX LTD                     12/23/2010 USA Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
SPECTRA SYSTEMS CORP                7/25/2011 USA Support Services 
MYCELX TECH0LOGIES CORP            8/4/2011 USA 
Oil Equipment, Services & 
Distribution 
ESCHER GROUP HLDGS PLC              8/8/2011 Republic of Ireland Software & Computer Services 
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MONEYSWAP PLC                       8/31/2011 Gibraltar General Financial 
BILFINGER BERGER GLOBAL INFRA 
SICAV 12/21/2011 Luxemburg Equity Investment Instruments 
 
10.2 Observations not included  
Beneath are two lists. The first contains all the observations where the IPO prospectus, and 
thus relevant IPO specific information, is not located. The second list contains all the 
observations where an IPO prospectus is found, but the IPO does not match the criteria for a 
foreign IPO. The two lists, together with the 86 sample firms, make up the 300 firms that are 
identified as the first (initial) sample of IPOs by foreign firms on the London stock exchange 
within the specified time frame. 
10.2.1 Missing IPO prospectus 
A list in alphabetical order of the 136 observations excluded because IPO prospectuses are not 
located. 
A&D PHARMA HLDGS NV 10/24/2006 Prospectus not found 
ADAMIND 2/21/2005 Prospectus not found 
ADULIS RESOURCES INC 12/2/2004 Prospectus not found 
ADWALKER 8/2/2005 Prospectus not found 
AGCERT INTERNATIONAL 6/8/2005 Prospectus not found 
AIM RESOURCES 3/21/2005 Prospectus not found 
AIR CHINA 12/15/2004 Prospectus not found 
AMTEK AUTO 11/25/2004 Prospectus not found 
ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO 3/19/2004 Prospectus not found 
BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK 1/26/2006 Prospectus not found 
BANK MUSCAT 10/5/2005 Prospectus not found 
BATEMAN ENGINEERING N.V. 10/21/2005 Prospectus not found 
BEXIMCO PHARMACEUTICALS 10/21/2005 Prospectus not found 
BODISEN BIOTECH INC 2/6/2006 Prospectus not found 
BOUNDARY CAPITAL PLC 5/15/2007 Prospectus not found 
C&C GROUP 5/19/2004 Prospectus not found 
CALEDONIA MINING CORP 6/27/2005 Prospectus not found 
CALYX GROUP 3/17/2005 Prospectus not found 
CARADOR 4/12/2006 Prospectus not found 
CARDIOMAG IMAGING INC 12/14/2005 Prospectus not found 
CARPATHIAN RESOURCES 3/31/2005 Prospectus not found 
CASPIAN ENERGY INC 9/21/2004 Prospectus not found 
CERAMIC FUEL CELLS 3/2/2006 Prospectus not found 
CHINA MEDSTAR LTD 11/30/2006 Prospectus not found 
CLEARSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES GROUP 11/12/2004 Prospectus not found 
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CNG TRAVEL GROUP 5/7/2004 Prospectus not found 
COMMERCIAL BANK OF QATAR(THE) 7/3/2008 Prospectus not found 
CONSOLIDATED COMMUNICATIONS CORP 9/30/2005 Prospectus not found 
CROSS SHORE ACQUISITION CORP 4/28/2006 Prospectus not found 
CYBERSCAN TECHNOLOGY INC 7/12/2005 Prospectus not found 
DAISHIN SECURITIES CO 11/2/2007 Prospectus not found 
DIC ENTERTAINMENT HLDGS INC 10/14/2005 Prospectus not found 
DIRECT WONEN N.V. 5/1/2007 Prospectus not found 
DORI MEDIA GROUP 3/24/2005 Prospectus not found 
DROMANA ESTATE 1/12/2005 Prospectus not found 
ECOSECURITIES GROUP 12/19/2005 Prospectus not found 
ELCOM INTERNATIONAL 4/16/2004 Prospectus not found 
ELECTROSTEEL CASTINGS 10/6/2005 Prospectus not found 
ELITEL TELECOM SPA 2/20/2006 Prospectus not found 
ELIXIR PETROLEUM LIMITED 5/16/2005 Prospectus not found 
ELKEDRA DIAMONDS 9/3/2004 Prospectus not found 
ENDACE 6/15/2005 Prospectus not found 
ENOVA SYSTEMS INC 7/26/2005 Prospectus not found 
EUROGOLD 7/20/2004 Prospectus not found 
EVRAZ GROUP SA 6/8/2005 Prospectus not found 
EXCAPSA SOFTWARE INC 2/16/2006 Prospectus not found 
FALKLAND GOLD & MINERALS 12/9/2004 Prospectus not found 
FARGLORY LAND DEVELOPMENT CO LTD 1/20/2011 Prospectus not found 
FEDERAL BANK 1/31/2006 Prospectus not found 
FIREONE GROUP 6/2/2005 Prospectus not found 
FIRST COMMUNICATIONS INC 7/2/2007 Prospectus not found 
FRUTAROM INDUSTRIES 2/8/2005 Prospectus not found 
GATEKEEPER SYSTEMS INC 12/6/2004 Prospectus not found 
GILAT SATCOM 8/9/2005 Prospectus not found 
GLOBEOP FINANCIAL SERVICES SA 7/30/2007 Prospectus not found 
GREAT WESTERN MINING CORP PLC 8/18/2011 Prospectus not found 
GREYSTAR RESOURCES 8/4/2004 Prospectus not found 
GROVE ENERGY 12/2/2004 Prospectus not found 
HALYK SAVINGS BANK OF KAZAKHSTN JSC 12/20/2006 Prospectus not found 
HANATOUR SERVICE INC 11/10/2006 Prospectus not found 
HANSEN TRANSMISSIONS INTL NV 12/11/2007 Prospectus not found 
HARD ASSETS INC 7/14/2004 Prospectus not found 
HIPCRICKET INC 11/27/2007 Prospectus not found 
IFR CAPITAL PLC 11/15/2006 Prospectus not found 
INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE DD 12/1/2006 Prospectus not found 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETING & SALES GRP 12/6/2005 Prospectus not found 
INTERNATIONAL METAL ENTERPRISES INC 10/3/2005 Prospectus not found 
INVESTCORP BANK B.S.C 12/8/2006 Prospectus not found 
INVU INC 1/6/2004 Prospectus not found 
IT & E LIMITED 12/12/2006 Prospectus not found 
ITHACA ENERGY INC 6/6/2006 Prospectus not found 
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KI-BI MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES 5/5/2005 Prospectus not found 
KUMHO TIRE CO INC 2/16/2005 Prospectus not found 
LECICO EGYPT S.A.E. 11/24/2004 Prospectus not found 
LLOYD ELECTRIC & ENGINEERING 10/13/2005 Prospectus not found 
LOTTE SHOPPING CO 2/8/2006 Prospectus not found 
LUCKY CEMENT LTD 5/14/2008 Prospectus not found 
MACQUARIE KOREA INFRASTRUCTURE 
FUND 3/14/2006 Prospectus not found 
MARCH NETWORKS CORP 4/27/2005 Prospectus not found 
MAXJET AIRWAYS INC 6/14/2007 Prospectus not found 
MONTO MINERALS LTD 5/25/2006 Prospectus not found 
NANETTE REAL ESTATE GROUP NV 6/27/2006 Prospectus not found 
NAPO PHARMACEUTICALS INC 7/31/2006 Prospectus not found 
NAUTILUS MINERALS INC 2/2/2007 Prospectus not found 
NEW MEDIA LOTTERY SERVICES 3/17/2006 Prospectus not found 
NEWCOURT GROUP 11/10/2005 Prospectus not found 
NOIDA TOLL BRIDGE CO 3/21/2006 Prospectus not found 
NORKOM GROUP PLC 6/26/2006 Prospectus not found 
NORMAN 95 SPA 7/28/2004 Prospectus not found 
NOVERA ENERGY 6/10/2005 Prospectus not found 
OGK 2 10/4/2007 Prospectus not found 
OIL & GAS DEVELOPMENT CO 12/6/2006 Prospectus not found 
ORCA INTERACTIVE 10/13/2004 Prospectus not found 
PALM HILLS DEVELOPMENTS SAE 5/8/2008 Prospectus not found 
PEACH HLDGS INC 3/30/2006 Prospectus not found 
PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORP 4/4/2008 Prospectus not found 
PHOSPHAGENICS 7/29/2004 Prospectus not found 
PLANTIC TECHNOLOGIES LTD 5/23/2007 Prospectus not found 
PLAZA CENTERS NV 11/1/2006 Prospectus not found 
PRINCIPLE CAPITAL HLDGS S.A. 11/3/2004 Prospectus not found 
PYATEROCHKA HLDG N.V. 5/11/2005 Prospectus not found 
QUEENCO LEISURE INTERNATIONAL LTD 7/9/2007 Prospectus not found 
QUESTAIR TECHNOLOGIES INC 12/21/2004 Prospectus not found 
REDLINE COMMUNICATIONS INC 12/6/2006 Prospectus not found 
REI AGRO 11/18/2005 Prospectus not found 
ROS AGRO PLC 4/13/2011 Prospectus not found 
SANATANA DIAMONDS INC 7/28/2005 Prospectus not found 
SCOTGOLD RESOURCES LTD 2/24/2010 Prospectus not found 
SISTEMA JSFC 2/14/2005 Prospectus not found 
SITESERV PLC 11/15/2006 Prospectus not found 
SITRONICS JSC 2/13/2007 Prospectus not found 
SMART TELECOM 9/10/2004 Prospectus not found 
SPACELABS HEALTHCARE INC 10/31/2005 Prospectus not found 
SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE 4/21/2005 Prospectus not found 
SYLVANIA RESOURCES LTD 7/21/2006 Prospectus not found 
TAEWOONG CO LTD 2/25/2008 Prospectus not found 
TATA STEEL 7/27/2009 Prospectus not found 
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TELECOM EGYPT 12/14/2005 Prospectus not found 
TELEUNIT SPA 5/26/2004 Prospectus not found 
TVC HLDGS PLC 7/11/2007 Prospectus not found 
UNITED BANK LTD 6/29/2007 Prospectus not found 
UTEK CORP 4/11/2005 Prospectus not found 
UTI BANK 3/22/2005 Prospectus not found 
VERSATILE SYSTEMS INC 4/16/2007 Prospectus not found 
VIGILANT TECHNOLOGY 12/20/2005 Prospectus not found 
VIMIO 9/2/2005 Prospectus not found 
VISONIC 4/15/2004 Prospectus not found 
VISUAL DEFENCE INC 5/6/2005 Prospectus not found 
WASABI ENERGY 12/3/2010 Prospectus not found 
WESTERN CANADIAN COAL CORP 10/7/2004 Prospectus not found 
WORLDSPREADS GROUP PLC 8/1/2007 Prospectus not found 
XL TECHGROUP INC 10/12/2004 Prospectus not found 
ZAMBEEF PRODUCTS 6/23/2011 Prospectus not found 
ZEEHAN ZINC LTD 3/6/2007 Prospectus not found 
2 WAY TRAFFIC N.V. 4/7/2006 Prospectus not found 
888 HLDGS 10/4/2005 Prospectus not found 
 
10.2.2 Sample criteria not met 
A list in alphabetical order of the 78 observations excluded because they do not match the 
strict sample criteria for foreign IPOs. IPO prospectuses are located successfully for these 
observations. 
 
ACRON JSC (GDR) 8/12/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
AER LINGUS GROUP PLC 10/2/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
AFI DEVELOPMENT PLC 5/11/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
AGI THERAPEUTICS 2/27/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
ALLIANCE BANK JSC 7/23/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
ALUMINIUM BAHRAIN BSC* 11/30/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
AMTEL VREDESTEIN NV 11/18/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
AVANGARDCO INVESTMENTS PUBLIC LTD 5/6/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
BANK OF GEORGIA JSC 11/29/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
CAZA OIL & GAS INC 12/12/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
CHELIABINSK ELEKTROLIT ZINK PLANT 11/13/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
CHERKIZOVO GROUP(OJSC) 5/15/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
CHINA REAL ESTATE OPPORTUNITIES SA 12/22/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
COMSTAR UNITED TELESYSTEM 2/13/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
DEPA LTD 4/23/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
DHX MEDIA 5/19/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
DIAMOND BANK*                     12/18/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN RESOURCES 5/9/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
EFES BREWERIES INTERNATIONAL NV 10/21/2004 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
77 
 
ENGEL EAST EUROPE N.V. 12/15/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
FERRUM CRESCENT LTD 12/15/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GENESIS WORLWIDE INC CDA 7/3/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GIPPSLAND 3/9/2004 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GITANJALI GEMS LIMITED*            12/17/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE 5/21/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GLOBAL PORTS INVESTMENTS PLC * 6/29/2011 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GLOBALTRANS INVESTMENT PLC  5/8/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GREAT EASTERN ENERGY CORP 12/13/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GRUPO CLARIN SA 10/25/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GUARANTY TRUST BANK 7/26/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
GULF FINANCE HOUSE 7/4/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
HAGL JSC 3/23/2011 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
HMS HYDRAULIC MACH & SYS GRP PLC* 2/14/2011 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
HRVATSKE TELEKOMUNIKACIJE D D 10/5/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
INNOLUX DISPLAY CORPORATION* 11/7/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
INVESTCOM LLC 10/11/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
INVISTA EUROPEAN REAL ESTATE TRUST 12/20/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
JUMPIT ASA 7/11/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
KAZMUNAIGAS EXPLORATION 
PRODUCTION 10/5/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
LSR GROUP OJSC* 11/16/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
MAGNIT OJSC 4/22/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
MAGNITOGORSK IRON & STEEL WORKS 4/30/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
MAIL.RU GROUP LTD 11/11/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
MCB BANK LTD 10/18/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
METMINCO LIMITED 4/1/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
MHP SA * 5/15/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
MTI WIRELESS EDGE 3/16/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
NEW WORLD RESOURCES NV 5/9/2008 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
NOMOS BANK OJSC 4/27/2011 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
NORTHWEST BIOTHERAPEUTICS INC 6/22/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
NOVATEK OAO 7/27/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
NOVOLIPETSK IRON AND STEEL CORP 12/15/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
NOVOROSSIYSK COMMERCIAL SEA PORT* 11/8/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
O'KEY GROUP SA 11/5/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
OAO SEVERSTAL 11/14/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
OAO TMK 11/3/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
ORIGIN ENTERPRISES PLC 6/5/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
ORMONDE MINING 4/19/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
PARTYGAMING 6/30/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
PETRONEFT RESOURCES 9/27/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
PHARMSTANDARD OJSC 5/11/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
PHOSAGRO OJSC * 7/18/2011 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
PIK GROUP OJSC 6/6/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
POLYMETAL OJSC 2/12/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
ROLTA INDIA 4/18/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
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ROSNEFT OJSC 7/19/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
SHALKIYAZINC NV 12/14/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
SISTEMA-HALS JSC 11/8/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
SMURFIT KAPPA PLC 3/20/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
TIANSHAN GOLDFIELDS 6/14/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
TITANIUM ASSET MANAGEMENT CORP 6/21/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
TRANSCONTAINER OJSC 11/12/2010 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
URALKALI JSC 10/19/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
VICEROY ACQUISITION CORP 7/12/2006 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
VIMETCO NV 8/2/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
VTB BANK(JSC) 5/17/2007 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
XXI CENTURY INVESTMENTS 12/16/2005 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
ZENTIVA NV 6/28/2004 Prospectus found. Sample criteria not met.  
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10.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the regression analysis.  
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10.4 Correlation table 
A correlation table displaying correlations between all the variables included in the regression 
analysis.  
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10.5 Main regression output 
Beneath are the results of the main regression model. 
 
Dependent Variable: UNDERPRICING  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/27/14   Time: 09:43   
Sample: 1 86    
Included observations: 86   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.111303 0.050262 2.214454 0.0298 
BOARD_SIZE 0.000501 0.006140 0.081570 0.9352 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -0.013431 0.090422 -0.148540 0.8823 
INDEPENDENT_CHAIRMAN -0.053254 0.030029 -1.773387 0.0802 
CEO_FOUNDER_DUALITY -0.027961 0.026976 -1.036548 0.3033 
CEO_EXPERIENCE 0.003129 0.003043 1.028193 0.3072 
UK_CONNECTION 0.032776 0.026863 1.220123 0.2262 
FIRM_AGE -0.002346 0.001143 -2.052955 0.0436 
FIRM_SIZE 3.36E-05 1.84E-05 1.829072 0.0714 
HIGH_TECH 0.009657 0.033344 0.289625 0.7729 
IPO_PROCEEDS -0.000345 0.000205 -1.685473 0.0961 
     
     R-squared 0.100143    Mean dependent var 0.072694 
Adjusted R-squared -0.019838    S.D. dependent var 0.111924 
S.E. of regression 0.113029    Akaike info criterion -1.403392 
Sum squared resid 0.958165    Schwarz criterion -1.089464 
Log likelihood 71.34585    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.277050 
F-statistic 0.834656    Durbin-Watson stat 2.078332 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.596934    Wald F-statistic 4.191983 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000125    
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11. Article
En global ökning av gränsöverskridande börsintroduktioner ställer 
höga krav på utländska företags styrelser 
Allt fler företag väljer utländska marknader för börsintroduktioner. Ämnet är 
idag högaktuellt, inte minst med anledning av den kinesiska e-handelsjätten 
Alibabas kommande introduktion på New York-börsen. En introduktion som 
väntas bli den största i världen på många år. Albertson Witting och Lundberg, 
två studenter vid Lunds universitet, har precis avslutat en omfattande empirisk 
studie av styrelsens roll vid gränsöverskridande börsintroduktioner.  
 
Sedan början på 2000-talet har antalet 
gränsöverskridande börsintroduktioner 
ökat kraftigt. Enligt en 
marknadsundersökning av PWC från 2012 
så utgjorde gränsöverskridande 
börsintroduktioner under 2011 nästan 20 % 
av det totala värdet av alla 
börsintroduktioner världen över. Finansiell 
globalisering och en ökad integrering av 
världens aktiemarknader bidrar till att 
företag i större utsträckning ser förbi de 
inhemska aktiemarknaderna. Två studenter 
vid Lunds universitet hävdar att vissa 
aspekter av företags styrelser kan ha 
avgörande effekter på hur utländska 
företag presterar vid gränsöverskridande 
börsintroduktioner.  
Felaktig prissättning dyr för 
aktieägarna 
Bolag som genomgår omvandlingen 
från privat ägda till publika, utmärker sig i 
regel som svåra för branschexperter och 
privata investerare att värdera.  
Avsaknaden av historiska 
operationella resultat och bristande 
informationsväxling gentemot banker och 
investerare, är bidragande orsaker till att 
nyintroducerade aktier historiskt sett 
skjuter i höjden under den första dagen på 
börsen. ”Som utländskt företag på en ny 
börs måste man skicka effektiva signaler 
för att förmedla ett korrekt värde på 
företagets aktier, annars kan företagets 
aktier säljas till rea-pris”, säger Albertson 
Witting. 
 
 
Styrelsens utformning avgörande 
De procent som ett företags aktier 
stiger under första dagen efter introduktion 
Innebär en direkt kostnad för företaget och 
dess ursprungliga ägare. Albertson Witting 
och Lundbergs studie visar att 
nyintroducerade utländska aktier på 
London-börsen mellan 2004 och 2011 i 
genomsnitt ökade 7,27 % under första 
dagen, en ökning som motsvarar kostander 
av mångmiljonbelopp för företagens 
ursprungliga ägare.  
”Att nyintroducerade aktier är 
systematiskt underprissatta förklaras oftast 
genom asymmetrisk information mellan å 
ena sidan företaget och investmentbanken 
och å andra sidan företaget och de 
utomstående investerarna. Företagets 
styrelse blir med andra ord väsentlig för att 
förmedla korrekt information mellan olika 
välinformerade intressenter”, säger 
Lundberg. 
Specifika styrelse-aspekter påverkar  
I Albertson Witting och Lunbergs 
studie studeras 86 utländska företag som 
valt att introducera sig på London-börsen 
mellan 2004 och 2011. Studenterna slår 
2 
 
fast att en oberoende styrelseordförande är 
vital för att minska underprissättningen av 
nyintroduktionen. 
”Ordförandens oberoende är 
någonting som värderas av både 
investerare och investmentbanker då 
aktieägarnas intressen kommer att 
prioriteras”, menar Lundberg.  
Utöver ordförandens oberoende 
undersöks hur storleken på styrelsen, 
styrelsens oberoende och om grundaren 
och vd:n är samma individ påverkar  
underprissättningen.  Några slutsatser 
angående dessa faktorers påverkan kan inte 
dras men duon menar att vidare forskning 
inom området skulle kunna ge andra 
resultat. ”Vid en undersökning av ett större 
urval skulle andra faktorers påverkan 
eventuellt kunna säkerställas och på så vis 
ge företag ytterligare teoretisk och praktisk 
vägledning vid utformandet av företagets 
styrelse vid gränsöverskridande 
börsintroduktioner” avslutar Albertson 
Witting. 
 
Glenn Glennsson 
Veckans Affärer
 
